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Abstract
This thesis is comprised of three papers which jointly examine the role of commodity
prices as well as other asset prices in influencing the evolution of economic activity in
a small-open economy (SOE). Using Canada as the quintessential small-open economy,
each chapter adopts a particular approach to investigating this dynamic relationship. It is
hoped that the contribution made in this thesis to understanding the relationship will aid
policy-makers as they attempt to address the associated policy questions which are often
fraught with difficulties and uncertainty.
In chapter 1 the use of a recursively identified Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) is em-
ployed to study the impact of commodity price shocks on Canada’s macro-economy. While
similar analysis has been carried out before, this has tended to focus solely on the impact
of oil prices. Additionally, the analysis has tended to focus on aggregate output, while
neglecting the specific sectoral impact. Given that each sectors’ exposure to commodity
price movements will be different, one would also expect varying sectoral responses to these
shocks. Chapter 1 attempts to focus on this and thus offers a level of insight into the op-
eration of the Canadian macro-economy which has not been extensively addressed in the
literature.
The results suggest that indeed there is divergent sectoral responses to commodity price
shocks, using a broad measure of commodity prices. The commodity producing sectors of
the economy respond favourably to an unexpected rise in commodity prices, whilst the
manufacturing sector is negatively impacted by such movements. We also found evidence
that policy-makers may attempt to contain any inflationary pressures emanating from
rising commodity prices by raising interest rates.
Chapter 2 delves even further into the dynamics of this relationship by employing a
v
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. In this chapter we extend the
analysis undertaken in chapter 1, where we are again attempting to ascertain the sectoral
responses to a commodity price shock. The use of this modelling framework however allows
us to analyse that relationship in a manner which is internally consistent and also in-line
with our beliefs about the behaviour of economic agents. Additionally, the DSGE model
allows us to conduct counter-factual policy experiments which were not possible using the
VAR framework.
The results of the model are generally in-line with those found in chapter 1, as the
commodity price shock has differing impacts on the various sectors of the economy. The
results suggest that just examining the aggregate effects of commodity price shocks could
overshadow important sectoral differences which are subsumed in these aggregate figures.
Additionally, the counter factual policy exercises indicate that actions taken by the Central
Bank during the Global Financial Crisis positively impacted Canada’s economic perfor-
mance during the crisis and the period immediately after.
In the final chapter, co-authored with Jean-Paul Lam, we seek to quantify the inter-
dependence between stock prices and monetary policy using an underidentified Structural
VAR (SVAR) for Canada and the United States. We find that employing a recursive
identification leads to counterfactual responses for the stock market following a monetary
policy shock. In the underidentified VAR, the stock market and monetary policy are al-
lowed to simultaneously react to each other’s shock through a combination of short-run,
long-run and sign restrictions. Unlike many studies in this literature, we impose a minimal
number of restrictions on the short-run and long-run matrix, allowing the data to uncover
the relationship between the variables in the SVAR. We find that an increase of 25 basis
points (b.p.) in the policy rate of the central bank leads to a fall of about 1.75% in stock
prices in Canada and to a fall of about 1.25% in stock prices in the U.S. This effect of
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monetary policy on stock prices is larger in Canada compared to the U.S. mainly because
sectors that are interest rate sensitive, such as financials and energy account for a much
larger share of the stock index in Canada compared to the U.S. Following a stock market
shock, the short-term interest, industrial production, inflation and commodity prices rise
both in Canada and in the U.S. A 1% increase in the stock market leads to an increase
of about 27 b.p. in the overnight rate in Canada while it leads to an increase of about 10
b.p. in the Federal funds rate.
vii
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Introduction
Commodity prices have experienced significant volatility over the past twenty years. In
fact, relative to the previous decade, commodity prices have on average more than doubled,
with some subgroups, such as energy related products experiencing above average volatility
and growth. Commodity-exporting economies such as Canada have therefore benefited
from favourable terms of trade (ToT) movements. However, the recent down-swing in
many of these commodity prices has resulted in a reversal of fortunes and renewed policy
discussions focused on the effects of commodity price fluctuations on output, inflation and
other macroeconomic variables, as well as appropriate policy responses to deal with such
volatility.
Given the above, the objective of the first two chapters of this thesis is to analyse
the effects of commodity price shocks in a small open economy commodity exporter, using
Canada as the prototypical example. To carry out this exercise, two different methodologies
are employed, firstly a structural VAR and secondly a DSGE model. The VAR allows us
to examine and uncover the patterns and dynamics present in the data. The second
method, the DSGE model complements this approach and enriches the analysis, while
getting around the problems often involved in identifying the structural shocks in a VAR
setting. It also allows us to build our model of the economy with a structural micro
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foundation and also analyse the propagation mechanism of commodity price shocks.
Chapter 1 considers a recursively identified VAR with commodity prices, aggregate and
sector-specific value-added output, as well as other macroeconomic indicators as variables.
Following Zha (1999) the model is estimated by maximum likelihood, with the optimal lag
length chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Impulse responses
are obtained to a one standard deviation commodity price shock and the corresponding
68 percent confidence bands calculated through the Monte Carlo procedure proposed by
Zha. The primary advantage of using VAR models is their ability to provide assessments
of the dynamic responses of key macroeconomic variables to shocks without requiring a
complete structural model of the economy. Their usefulness in uncovering the transmission
mechanism of macroeconomic shocks has contributed significantly to their popularity in
the literature. For this reason they are employed in this thesis to examine the relationship
between the Canadian macro-economy and commodity prices.
In chapter 2, we examine this topic even further, by examining the general equilibrium
linkages throughout the economy. While reduced form analysis is useful for examining the
relationship among a subset of variables, the actual economy is much more complicated
and consist of numerous links among multiple variables. Due to the problem of over-
parametrisation which we would quickly encounter in a VAR setting, this framework does
not offer us the flexibility to fully explore these linkages. For this reason, an alternative
modelling framework is needed, as is provided by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model - the subject of focus for chapter 2. We will seek to answer a similar question
to that posed in chapter 1, but this alternative framework should allow us to explore
the more complex relationships which exist within the Canadian economy. The model
employed is a calibrated version of the DSGE model developed in Dib (2008), to which we
make some minor modifications largely to improve tractability. In our context, the model
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is also applied to examine a different question than that which was addressed by Dib.
More specifically, while Dib examined welfare effects, we will be seeking to assess what the
macroeconomic and sectoral impacts are to a commodity price shock. Additionally, we
conduct counter-factual policy exercises to examine how the economy would have evolved
in response to alternative policy actions adopted by the monetary authority when faced
with drastically declining commodity prices following the onset of the global financial crisis.
Chapter 3 is a joint paper between my supervisor, Professor Jean-Paul Lam and myself.
In this chapter, we investigate the interactions between stock prices and monetary policy
using an underidentified SVAR for Canada and the United States. In the model, the stock
market and monetary policy are allowed to simultaneously react to each other’s shock
through a combination of short-run, long-run and sign restrictions. Unlike many studies
in this literature, we impose a minimal number of restrictions on the short-run and long-
run matrix, thereby allowing the data as much as possible to uncover the relationship
between the variables in the SVAR. Allowing for this simultaneity is particularly useful as
asset prices, such as stocks, generally contain information which is relevant to the conduct
of monetary policy. This is so as they are considered to be leading indicators, either of
inflation or economic activity and both of these variables are of relevance to an inflation-
targeting central bank. Our results suggest that stock prices and monetary policy respond
to each other’s shock on impact. This response is generally significant and consequently,
studies which impose a zero restriction on impact may be understating the interrelationship
between stock prices and monetary policy.
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Chapter 1
Sectoral Impact of Commodity Price
Shocks on the Canadian Economy
1.1 Introduction
In the media and among official sources, movements in commodity prices have often been
cited as significantly affecting economic activity in Canada.1 See Poloz (2014), Faruqee
et al. (2015), Rubin (2015) and Kirby (2014) among others. To illustrate, in a presentation
by the Governor of the Central Bank in 2015, to Calgary Economic Development he noted
that “Natural resources have been a big economic story for this country since the time of
European contact.” He further noted that “Any economy that relies on natural resources
will naturally be challenged by large movements in their prices. These shocks are more than
1As used in this paper, commodities refer to raw materials or primary agricultural products that can
be bought and sold on international market, and are interchangeable with other products of the same
type. More specifically, the definition includes, agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying, oil and gas
extraction.
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just swings in national income; they also force businesses to make decisions about the way
resources such as capital and labour are allocated. These decisions often lead to difficult
adjustments, but they are necessary for maximizing our economy’s potential.” Given the
often repeated notion of the importance of commodity prices, an analytical assessment of
their impact is relevant.
This study is further motivated by the observation that although the Canadian economy
shares some similarities with other industrial nations, such as the US (see Backus et al.
(1995), Schmitt-Grohe (1998)), it does exhibit significant differences which are largely
related to the influence of commodity prices. In particular, it is observed that Canada’s
trade balance is positively correlated with commodity prices, and the real exchange rate
tends to appreciate in response to higher commodity prices as well. Such effects are absent
for other non-commodity exporting industrial nations. Thus answers are sought to the
question, what are the aggregate and sector-specific impact of commodity price shocks in
the Canadian context? In particular, we will seek to assess the impact of movements in an
aggregate commodity price index on both overall economic activity as well as sector specific
output. As a significant exporter of a wide range of commodities, the Canadian economy
is sensitive to changes in global commodity prices which can affect economic activity both
through the terms of trade, as well as via changing demand for other Canadian exports,
such as manufactured goods.
For Canada, a significant proportion of exports is comprised of commodities. Conse-
quently, rising commodity prices which began in 2002, due to higher prices for oil, gold
and agricultural commodities, led to an appreciating exchange rate, rising Gross National
Income and higher standards of living as measured by the Index of Economic Well Being,
(see Osberg et al. (2016)). Further contributing to the commodity boom, was the in-
creased demand for commodities from rapidly expanding Asian economies such as China.
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The combination of these factors, meant that Canadians benefited from higher purchasing
power during that period, and this was translated into above average economic activity,
such as higher real incomes, consumption and investment.
These favourable conditions have persisted until quite recently. The slowdown in global
economic activity precipitated by the financial crisis in the US, resulted in declining com-
modity prices and a reversal of fortunes for major commodity exporters like Canada. Given
the relatively large reliance on commodity exports and the great degree of volatility to
which their prices are subject, quantifying the effects of commodity price shocks is un-
doubtedly an important issue.
Previous papers have generally agreed on the importance of commodity price move-
ments and terms of trade shocks for the Canadian economy, see Vasishtha and Maier
(2013) for example. What has been lacking in the literature however, is an assessment
of the sectoral impact of these shocks. Intuitively, one expects commodity price shocks
to affect the productive sectors of the economy differently, since each sector has a differ-
ent level of exposure (both directly and indirectly) to movements in commodity prices.
Furthermore, economic theory suggests that these relative price changes should induce a
reallocation of resources and as such, contribute to the differential sectoral impact.2 The
objective of this paper is to assess the impact of a broad-based measure of commodity prices
on sectoral GDP and thereby offer some useful insights about the particular structure of
the Canadian economy.3
To accomplish this objective, a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model is es-
2Industries which produce commodities, like the energy sector are expected to be positively affected
by an increase in commodity prices, whereas those who use commodities as a significant input and rely
heavily on exports, such as manufacturing, are expected to be negatively impacted.
3The measure of commodity prices employed is the Bank of Canada’s Total Commodity Price Index.
According to the Bank, this is a price index of the spot or transaction US dollar prices of 24 commodities
produced in Canada and sold in world markets.
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timated, over the period February 1997 to April 2016. We build on and extend previous
works which have examined the importance of international shocks in the Canadian con-
text, see Cushman and Zha (1997), Zha (1999), Bhuiyan (2012), among others. The SVAR
framework is particularly useful in assessing the empirical relationship between commod-
ity prices and macroeconomic variables in Canada, as it provides a summary of the joint
movements within the data. By imposing a set of identifying restrictions on the estimated
residuals we can analyse the dynamic impact of the structural shocks on the system of
variables. In the current setting, such impulse-response analysis, allows for the empirical
assessment of the effects of unexpected commodity price shocks. 4
The major finding of the study is that commodity price shocks have a significant positive
impact on the output of the commodity producing sectors of the economy. Manufacturing
however, is negatively impacted by increases in commodity prices over the long term. Do-
mestic inflation is also found to increase in response to rising commodity prices. However,
the impact is short lived, and quite likely reflects the response of policy makers, as the
interest rate also rises significantly to counteract these inflationary pressures. As has been
noted previously, this study also finds a strong positive relationship between commodity
prices and the exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2, briefly discuses lit-
erature relevant to the topic under consideration. Section 1.3 examines the relationship
between commodities and Canadian economic activity, further highlighting the importance
of commodity prices. Section 1.4 discusses the methodology employed, including the data
and identifying assumptions. The results of the model are presented in Section 1.5, where
there is a discussion of the baseline model as well as some robustness checks. Finally,
4Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007) also illustrate that if the variables chosen for the model are relevant
and if appropriate identifying restrictions are imposed, then the impulse responses of a structural VAR
adequately portray the dynamic behaviour of the macroeconomic variables due to the structural shocks.
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Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Of all the commodities, oil has undoubtedly received the most attention and since the
pioneering work of Darby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) in the U.S. context, several studies
have sought to assess the relationship between oil prices and the macro-economy in both
developed and developing countries. Previous papers which have examined the relation-
ship between resource prices and economic activity in Canada, have also tended to focus
primarily on the energy sector and more specifically on oil prices. These include articles by
Stuber (2001), Kremmidas (2011), and Schaufele (2016). The general conclusion of these
papers is that Canada’s economic fortunes are closely tied to that of the energy sector.
A subset of these papers specifically examine the uncertainty associated with energy
prices and how economic activity is affected by this uncertainty. Jo (2012) for example,
examines the time-varying volatility associated with oil prices in order to assess how oil
price uncertainty could affect real economic activity. She finds that uncertainty relating
to oil prices has a significantly negative impact on both global and Canadian economic
activity. Similarly, Bashar et al. (2013) examine the link between oil price uncertainty
and macroeconomic activity in the context of Canada. Their results suggest that while
shocks to oil price level do not affect the level of aggregate output, oil price uncertainty
does exert a considerable influence on the Canadian economy. Huang et al. (2005) using a
multivariate threshold autoregressive model for the U.S, Canada, and Japan also finds that
oil-price volatility has an effect on these economies if the change was below the threshold
level. However, if the change exceeds the threshold, then movements in the level of oil
prices better explains macroeconomic variables rather than oil-price volatility.
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Focusing more on changes to commodity prices itself, rather than its volatility, Char-
navoki and Dolado (2014) use a combination of structural VAR methodology, structural
dynamic factor model and factor augmented VAR5, to categorise the main world commod-
ity price shocks and assess the impact of these shocks on a small commodity exporting
economy, such as Canada. They find that a rise in commodity prices generates a positive
effect on the trade balance and results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. These
responses have been coined the “commodity currency effect” and was pioneered in the work
of Chen and Rogoff (2003) and expanded in other studies such as Cashin et al. (2004).
Vasishtha and Maier (2013) also use a large scale factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR)
model to analyse how global developments, including movements in commodity prices, im-
pact the Canadian economy. They conclude that Canada benefits from higher commodity
prices through a positive terms of trade shock. This benefit however, is tempered by the
extent to which higher commodity prices lower global economic activity, as this would
negatively impact Canada’s non-commodity exports. Similar results are also reported by
Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010), in their study of net oil-producing and oil-consuming
countries. They find that for net oil-producers, such as Russia and Canada, a positive
oil price shock significantly increases GDP. However, oil-producers are also negatively im-
pacted by the indirect effects of an oil price increase. Namely, higher oil prices result in
lower economic activity in oil-importing countries, such that their volume of oil-imports
may decline.
In the stream of literature that examines industry impact, Lee and Ni (2002) employ a
VAR model to examine the effects of shocks to oil prices across several different industries
in the United States. Their results suggest that for most industries, positive oil price shocks
5Structural dynamic factor models were largely developed in the work of Stock and Watson (2005)
and Forni et al. (2009) and for factor augmented VARs see Bernanke et al. (2005), Boivin and Giannoni
(2008) and Mumtaz and Surico (2009).
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result in a significant reduction of output. Similarly, Fukunaga et al. (2010) conclude that
the impact of oil price changes on industrial output in the U.S. and Japan is significant
and is influenced by industry characteristics. Kilian and Baumeister also demonstrate the
macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks on several industrial nations, including the
US and Canada in an extensive series of publications.6
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2008) focuses specifically on the manufacturing industry in six
OECD countries 7 and report that a positive oil price shock decreases the level of manu-
facturing output in all countries.8 However, this shock produces different responses across
sub-industries within the manufacturing sector. Guidi (2010) examines the responsiveness
of the UK manufacturing and services sector to oil price shocks, and finds that while the
manufacturing sector contracts significantly in response to a positive shock, the services
sector is relatively unaffected.
Among developed nations, numerous other papers find that positive oil price shocks
have a negative impact on industrial output, (see Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser
and Goodwin (1986), Hooker (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Schmidt and
Zimmermann (2007)). The negative impact of a positive oil price shock on manufacturing
and industrial output, is not unexpected, as industries in these sectors tend to have a
high energy content in their production processes. Economic theory would suggest that
the energy-intensity of the industry under consideration would affect the magnitude of its
response, and this expectation has been borne out in the above cited studies.
Additionally, there are several studies which examine the effects of commodity price
6See Kilian and Barsky (2004), Kilian (2008a), Kilian (2008b), Kilian (2009), Lewis and Kilian (2011),
Kilian (2014), Baumeister and Kilian (2014), Baumeister and Kilian (2016), Baumeister et al. (2010), and
Baumeister and Peersman (2013).
7These countries included France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the US and UK
8See also Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) which examine the relationship between oil price
shocks and real GDP growth in a subset of OECD countries.
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movements on economic activity within the context of developing countries. Farzanegan
and Markwardt (2009) examine the relationship between oil price shocks and key macroe-
conomic variables in Iran by applying a VAR approach. They find that positive oil price
shocks significantly affect inflation as well as the growth of industrial output. In contrast,
Olomola and Adejumo (2006) and Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011) find that for Nigeria, oil
price shocks do not have a major impact on most macroeconomic variables. Eltony and
Al-Awadi (2001) find evidence that oil price shocks are important in explaining macroeco-
nomic variables, and in particular government spending, in Kuwait. For the Philippines,
Raguindin and Reyes (2005) report that positive shocks to oil prices result in a sustained
reduction in domestic output and also that negative shocks have a larger impact than
positive ones. For China, Du et al. (2010) and Tang et al. (2010) report that oil price
increases negatively affect output and investment, but positively affect the inflation and
interest rates, with the real effects being much more persistent than the nominal ones.
Silva (2011) report that for a subset of Latin American countries, domestic output in-
crease after a positive commodity price shock. These results are generally in line with a
priori expectations.
While the above cited studies have focused on the impact of commodity price shocks
at the aggregate level and a few focus on the industry impact of oil price shocks, to date,
studies which focus on the differential sectoral impact of a broad-based commodity price
index, specifically in the Canadian context, are limited. Knop and Vespignani (2014), is
among the few which have examined this sectoral issue in the context of Australia. They
find that commodity price shocks largely affect the mining, construction and manufacturing
industries, whereas the financial and insurance sectors were relatively unresponsive.
This paper follows in the spirit of Knop and Vespignani (2014), however, in contrast to
them, we take commodity prices to be an international variable and it is therefore exogenous
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to the domestic economy. They however, assumed that domestic variables could affect
commodity prices with a lag, and so Australia was not strictly modelled as a small-open
economy, since it could impact the international price of its commodity exports (albeit
with a lag).
This paper maintains the assumption that Canada is a small open economy (SOE)
and net exporter of commodities. That is, while Canada participates in the international
trade of commodities, it is small enough compared to its trading partners that it is not
able to alter world commodity prices, and hence, is a price-taker. Additionally, unlike
many of the studies which have examined the impact of commodity prices on Canada, this
paper employs the use of the Bank of Canada’s Commodity Price index, rather than just
a sole focus on oil prices. This index includes a wide range of industrial and agricultural
commodities, and is therefore relatively more representative of the commodity price shocks
that Canada faces rather than an index which solely focuses on oil prices. This is important
because oil prices can exhibit significant volatility which are specific to the global political
economy in which oil prices are determined and as such, are unrelated to the conditions
influencing other commodity prices.
Table 1.1 presents a survey of studies which have examined the impact of commodity
price shocks on economic activity, both in the Canadian and international context.
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Table 1.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (VARs)
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Soojin Jo
(2012)
world crude oil
production
real price of crude oil
world industrial
production
1958Q2 - 2008Q3 VAR with
stochastic volatility
of oil prices
Oil price uncertainty af-
fects world real economic
activity in a significantly
negative way
Charnavoki
et al.
(2014)
world: real economic
activity, inflation, real
commodity prices
domestic: real activity
indicators, inflation
series, exchange rates,
financial variables
1975Q1 - 2010Q4 VAR
Dynamic factor
model
FAVAR
Positive commodity price
shocks, positively impact
the external balance and
appreciates the exchange
rate
Vasishtha
et al.
(2013)
real activity: output
growth, industrial
production, exports,
employment
inflation:CPI, producer
price index, core inflation,
wage growth, import
prices others: monetary
aggregates, various
interest rates
1985M1 to 2008M5 FAVAR Canada benefits from a
positive commodity price
shock, but only to the ex-
tent that this shock does
not significantly dampen
global economic activity
Bashar et al.
(2013)
industrial production,
CPI, money stock,
overnight interest rate,
exchange rate, federal
funds rate, oil price, oil
price uncertainty
198M1 - 2011M12 SVAR Shocks to the level of oil
prices do not play a ma-
jor role in shaping out-
put variations in Canada,
however output is signifi-
cantly affected by shocks
to the volatility of oil
prices
Knop et al.
(2014)
world: real GDP,
inflation, interest rate
domestic: commodity
prices, non-farm real
GDP, sector-specific real
GVA, industry profits
before income tax,
nominal GVA, inflation
rate, interest rate,
exchange rate
1993Q1 - 2013Q1 SVAR Mining and construction
were largely impacted by
commodity price shocks,
whereas financial and in-
surance sectors were rel-
atively unaffected. The
manufacturing sector was
also impacted, however re-
sponses varied among the
sub-indices.
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Table 1.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (VARs) Cont’d
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Lee et al.
(2002)
macro variables: M2,
3-month T-bill rate, CPI,
10-year treasury rate,
industrial production, oil
price
industry variables:
industry-level output and
price
1959M1 - 1997M9 Identified VAR Both the demand and sup-
ply of industries are af-
fected by oil price shocks.
Oil price shocks primarily
reduce the supply of oil-
intensive industries while
they mainly reduce the de-
mand of other industries.
Jimenez-
Rodriguez
(2008)
real oil price in domestic
currency;
sector-specific industrial
output
1975M1 - 1998M12 Recursively
identified VAR
A positive oil price shock
lowers the level of aggre-
gate manufacturing out-
put in all countries under
study.
Guidi
(2010)
real oil price;
sector-specific industrial
output; sector-specific
real wage; real effective
exchange rate; inflation;
short-term interest rate;
long-term interest rates
1970Q1 - 2005Q4 Recursive VAR Positive oil price shocks
negatively affect the
UK manufacturing sec-
tor however, the ser-
vices sector is relatively
unaffected.
Ichiro et al.
(2010)
world: crude oil output;
industrial output; spot
crude oil price
domestic: aggregate
industrial production;
industry production;
industry producer prices
1973M1 - 2008M12 Block-Recursive
Identified VAR
Unanticipated oil price in-
creases negatively impact
the US economy both at
the aggregate and indus-
try levels, however the im-
pact on Japans economy
is ambiguous at the aggre-
gate level, but positive for
oil-intensive industries.
Farzanegan
et al.
(2009)
Industrial GDP per
capita, real public
consumption
expenditures, real
imports, real effective
exchange rate, inflation,
real oil prices changes
1975Q2 - 2006Q4 VAR Positive oil price shocks
increase the real effec-
tive exchange rate and the
growth of industrial out-
put in Iran.
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Table 1.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (VARs) Cont’d
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Iwayemi
et al.
(2010)
real GDP, government
expenditures, inflation,
real exchange rate, net
exports
1985Q1 - 2007Q4 unrestricted VAR Positive oil price shocks
do not have a signifi-
cant impact on macroeco-
nomic variables in Nigeria,
but there does appear the
be asymmetric effects, as
negative oil price shocks
do significantly affect out-
put and the real exchange
rate.
Du et al.
(2010)
real GDP, inflation, real
oil price, short-term
interest rate, money
supply
1995M1 - 2008M12 VAR Inflation and economic
growth in China are
significantly impacted by
world oil shocks, however
China’s economic activity
fails to significantly affect
world oil prices.
da Silva
(2011)
foreign: real GDP,
inflation,fed funds rate,
world commodity price
index
domestic: real GDP,
inflation, interest rate,
exchange rate
2000M1 - 2011M1 SVAR Real GDP, domestic infla-
tion and interest rates in
a subset of Latin Ameri-
can countries increases af-
ter a positive commodity
price shock.
1.3 A Closer Look at Commodities and the Canadian
Economy
To place this study in context it is useful to examine the role played by commodities in the
Canadian economy. In looking at the sectoral composition of the Canadian economy some
salient features are observed, the more prominent of which are highlighted in Table 1.2.
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From this table we can see that a significant proportion of production in the commodities
sector is exported, and that relative to the manufacturing and services sector, commodities
contribute significantly more to net exports. This observation is further collaborated by
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, which emphasise the high degree of export dependence on the
commodity sector.9 These figures reveal that commodity exports consistently account for
on average, 48 percent of total exports and 14 percent of real GDP. These are relatively
high figures for any economy. Even during the period of the global financial crisis, there
was no significant departures from these averages.
Table 1.2: Sectoral Composition of the Canadian Economy
Gross Value
Added
(% of total)
Employment
(% of total)
Export (%
of industry
production)
Net export
(% of total GDP)
Primary Commodity Sector 8.4 5.5 32.7 2.3
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3.0 4.0 17.3 0.6
Mining and quarrying 5.4 1.4 45.1 1.6
Tradable Sector 16.4 15.4 42.3 -2.4
Manufacturing 16.4 15.4 42.3 -2.4
Non-tradable Sector 75.2 79.2 5.7 0.8
Utilities 3.1 0.9 6.0 0.2
Construction 6.1 6.0 - -
Services 66.0 72.2 6.9 0.6
Source: Charnavoki and Dolado (2014); Data: CANSIM, average over 1975-2010
Additionally, according to Natural Resources Canada estimates, in 2015 natural re-
sources (which includes primary commodities such as forestry, mining and energy) directly
and indirectly accounted for 1.75 million jobs in Canada (see Figure A.1a), represented 17
percent of nominal GDP (see Figure A.1b), contributed over 40% of total non-residential
9Throughout this thesis, commodity sector, resource sector and natural resource sector are all used
interchangeably.
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Figure 1.1: Commodity Exports as a Percentage of Total Goods Exports
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Source: CANSIM, author’s calculations
Figure 1.2: Commodity Exports as a Percentage of Real GDP
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capital investment (see Figure A.1c) and over the period 2010 - 2014, contributed $27
billion on average, to government revenues (see Figure A.1d).
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada also reported that in 2014 the agricultural and agri-
food industry provided one in eight jobs in Canada, which translated into employment of
over 2.3 million people. They also noted that this industry contributed over $100 billion
annually to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), representing 6.6 percent of Canada’s
GDP in 2014.10 Given this highlighted importance, it is necessary to not only understand,
but also to quantify how shocks to the price of commodities is likely to impact domestic
economic activity. In the next section, the model and data that will be used to do this is
presented.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Methodology
The analysis is carried out, with a structural vector auto-regressive (SVAR) model in
order to assess the relationship between commodity prices and macroeconomic activity in
Canada. This system may be expressed as in equation 1.1, where the constant term and
any exogenous variables have been omitted for ease of exposition:
A0yt =
p∑
l=1
Alyt−l + εt (1.1)
where A0 is a n×n contemporary parameter matrix, yt, a n×1 column vector of endogenous
variables at time t, Al a n × n parameter matrix of lagged coefficients, and εt, a n × 1
10Information taken from An Overview of the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food System 2016.
18
column vector of structural disturbances, t = 1, . . . , T is the sample size and p, the lag
length of the VAR.11 The structural disturbances are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Ω.
We may further write the model more compactly in matrix form as follows:
Ayt = Gzt + εt (1.2)
where A = A0, G = [A1 . . . Ap] and zt = [yt−1 . . . yt−p]′. In equation 1.2, G is the n × np
matrix of lagged coefficients and zt is the np × 1 column vector of lagged endogenous
variables. Thus, the parameters of the structural model are contained in A and G. Since A
captures the contemporaneous relationship of the variables, direct estimation of equation
1.2 can prove difficult. However, given that A is invertible, the reduced-form of the model
may be obtained by pre-multiplying equation 1.2 by A−1 to obtain:
yt = Bzt + ut (1.3)
where B = A−1G and ut = A−1εt, with variance-covariance matrix Σ.12 It can further be
shown that Σ and the structural variance-covariance matrix Ω, are related according to
Σ = A−1ΩA−1
′
. As the regressors of equation 1.3 are all predetermined and not contem-
poraneous, it can be estimated efficiently and consistently using conventional techniques,
such as maximum likelihood, and the structural shocks of interest, recovered by imposing
appropriate identifying restrictions.
In the identification process, it is important to correctly characterise the relationship
between the foreign and domestic variables in the model. Canada’s economy is approxi-
11The parameters of the individual equations in the VAR are contained in the rows of A0 and Al
12ut is the reduced form matrix of residuals.
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mately one-tenth as large as the economy of the United States, 13 with about 75 percent
of Canada’s exports destined for the US, and about 20 percent of US exports for Canada.
Thus, it seems unreasonable to conclude that economic activity in Canada could signifi-
cantly affect US or world variables. In fact, Zha (1999) has shown that implausible con-
clusions can be reached when the small-open economy (SOE) structure of the Canadian
economy is ignored within a VAR setting.14 Consequently, in this study, such a structure
is imposed via a block exogeneity assumption.
In doing so, we note that yt is comprised of two blocks. A domestic block ydt, which
contains the Canadian variables and a foreign block yft, which contains the US and world
variables. Thus the structural model in equation 1.2 can be written as:
A11 0
A21 A22
yft
ydt
 =
G11 0
G21 G22
zft
zdt
+
εft
εdt
 (1.4)
where we have restricted the parameters of A and G so that economic developments in
Canada do not affect foreign variables either contemporaneously, A12 = 0, or with a lag,
G12 = 0.
In the reduced-form model, the SOE assumption is represented as follows:yft
ydt
 =
B11 0
B21 B22
zft
zdt
+
uft
udt
 (1.5)
13As measure by real GDP in 2015.
14Zha (1999) found for example, that when the block exogenous structure of the US-Canada economic
relationship is ignored, then shocks to Canadian variables contributed 67 percent to fluctuations in US
interest rates, 62 percent to fluctuations in US price level and 45 percent to fluctuations in US output.
Such results are anomalous to the actual economic relationship which exists between the US and Canada.
Johnson and Schembri (1990) and Souki (2008) also found that relative to domestic shocks, U.S. based
shocks are more important in explaining Canadian macroeconomic variability.
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with the contemporaneous restrictions imposed in the A matrix, which as stated above, is
related to the estimated reduced-form variance-covariance matrix, Σ.
The structural innovations in equation 1.4 can be recovered from equation 1.5 if an
appropriate identification method can be found for the system. The identification method
requires placing additional zero restrictions on the A matrix based on theoretical beliefs
about the contemporaneous interactions among the variables. In, the baseline analysis, the
structural shocks are identified using a recursive ordering approach. No additional restric-
tions are imposed on the lagged coefficients except the block-exogeneity restrictions on the
foreign variables in the domestic equations, as shown above in the matrix representations
of the model.
The foreign block is kept in the lower-triangular order of output, inflation, interest rate
and finally commodity prices. Commodity prices are placed in the foreign block since it is
believed that Canada is a price-taker and is too small to significantly affect the world prices
of the commodities which it exports. This assumption is fairly standard in the literature
which examines the impact of external shocks on small open economies, (see Silva (2011),
Knop and Vespignani (2014), among others). It is also placed last because it is a relatively
fast moving variable and its value generally reflects all available relevant information rather
quickly.15 For the domestic block, the variables are also ordered lower triangular in the
form output, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate. Thus, output is the most exogenous
of the domestic variables and exchange rate, the most endogenous such that it is impacted
by the shocks of all the other domestic variables.
Following Cushman and Zha (1997) and Zha (1999), the foreign variables are treated
15Commodities are often traded on futures markets using financial contracts, and so their prices tend to
fluctuate daily and incorporate all publicly available information. Consequently, placing them last in the
external block of the VAR reflects their usage as financial assets which can adjust almost instantaneously
to news concerning the other foreign variables, such as foreign interest rates.
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as exogenous from Canada’s point of view in order to strictly maintain the small-open-
economy assumption. In his paper, Zha (1999) developed an algorithm to estimate block
recursive VARs. This algorithm uses a generalized block Monte Carlo method to obtain
maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the parameters and to calculate error bands. Zha
applied this methodology to examine monetary policy shocks in the Canadian context.
However, the methodology, which is also able to handle highly parameterized models, will
be employed here to examine the impact of commodity price shocks. Thus, to study the
question posed in this chapter, the methodology formulated by Zha (1999) is utilised such
that the model is estimated via maximum likelihood and the block exogenous structure of
the model is accounted for.
While VAR models are an established tool in macroeconomics for describing the data
generating process of time-series variables and have the advantage that statistical inference
can be undertaken using standard methods, direct interpretation of the VAR parameters
is often difficult. Consequently, analysing the interaction among variables via direct exam-
ination of the coefficients is also rendered difficult. Therefore, to examine the interaction
among the variables, impulse response functions (IRFs) are generally employed. Since
these are determined from the coefficients of the estimated parameters, they too are es-
timates and their estimation uncertainty is often indicated by plotting error bands along
with the estimated IRF coefficients. The error bands reported in this study are based on
the Monte Carlo simulation method outlined in Zha (1999).16
In much of the applied VAR literature, either 68 percent or 95 percent error bands are
normally reported. However, Sims (1987) presents arguments against the use of 95 percent
error bands in VAR studies, on the basis that “there is no scientific justification for testing
16The method involves draws made directly from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients,
where the error bands are calculated using Monte Carlo integration over several replications. The .16 and
.84 fractiles are then graphed to delineate the .68 probability band.
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hypotheses at the 5 percent significance level in every application.” He instead, advocates
that the significance of the impulse responses derived from the VAR coefficient estimates,
be treated differently from coefficient estimates obtained in standard econometric models.
It is an inherent feature in VAR models that a large number of the estimated parameter
coefficients are not statistically different from zero, and consequently are insignificant when
evaluated at the 5 percent level. This automatically translates into extremely large error
bands for the impulse response functions. Despite this, it has generally been found by both
empirical and theoretical researchers, that the estimates from reduced-form VARs provide
a useful and valid summary of the data generating process. Allowing for this, Sims and Zha
(1999) recommend the use of 68 percent error bands for the estimated impulse response
functions. Thus this paper, adopts this probability level when evaluating the IRFs.17
1.4.2 Data
The model is estimated using seasonally adjusted monthly data for the period 1997:M2
to 2016:M4. Based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a lag length of 2 was
also selected.18 The model includes four foreign and five domestic variables. The foreign
variables are US industrial production as a measure of output, US CPI inflation, the federal
funds rate and the Bank of Canada commodity price index.19 The US is used to represent
the foreign economy as it is Canada’s closest, and main trading partner. The domestic
17Consequently, the constructed error bands contain the true impulse response functions with 68 percent
probability. This is generally equivalent to the one standard deviation confidence intervals that are usually
computed in standard econometric models, under the assumption of normality (or more specifically, of
normally distributed error terms).
18Other lag-length selection criteria, such as Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) or Hannan-Quinn
Criterion (HQC) for example, suggested alternative lag-lengths of 1, 3 and 4. Two was selected to maintain
a balance between omitted variables and over-parametrisation. As discussed in our robustness section
however, the relevant results are not unduly affected by changes in lag length.
19Here again we reiterate that commodity prices are viewed as a foreign variable, because Canada is a
price taker in its export market.
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variables are total real gross value added (GVA), a measure of sectoral production as given
by industry real gross value added, CPI inflation, the overnight rate and the US/Canada
bilateral exchange rate. All US variables are taken from the FRED database, and all
domestic variables from CANSIM. Further information about the data may be found in
Table A.1 in Appendix A. For each sector of the domestic economy, a separate VAR
is estimated.20 An aggregate model that excludes sectoral production measures is also
estimated to examine the impact of commodity price shocks on the macro variables.
These choice of variables are fairly standard in models of this type and are meant to
capture the main drivers of economic activity in the domestic economy while maintaining
model parsimony. US output, inflation and policy rate are intended to capture the impact
of economic conditions in advanced economies on Canada21 and commodity prices are
included as our main variable of interest, but also because it captures the fact that Canada
is a significant commodity exporter.
GVA and its components, enter the model as log deviations from a quadratic trend.22
Specifying output as a deviation from trend bears consistency with the way this variable
often enters the reaction function of policy makers. That is, output is usually thought
of in terms of deviation from potential (or its long-run trend) and it is for this reason
that we prefer a trend specification for these variables over first differences. The consumer
price index (CPI) enters the model in monthly changes (that is, inflation) and so does
20For the sectoral models, the measure of total GVA included is net of the value-added of the particular
industry under review, such that total output is equal to the sum of total GVA in the model plus industry
GVA.
21Several papers (see Cushman and Zha (1997) and Bhuiyan (2012)) have also postulated that the
Canadian monetary policy function responds to changes in the US policy rate. Thus suggesting that these
US variables can affect Canada’s macro variables.
22The use of a quadratic trend accounts for the reduction in the general pace of economic growth in
the US since the 1900’s. The results remain virtually unchanged if a linear trend is used instead for the
output variables. Similarly, using growth rates did not yield significantly different results.
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commodity prices. The interest rate variables are in levels and the exchange rate in (log)
levels as well. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test indicates stationarity of the
transformed variables at conventional levels of significance. A dummy variable for the
period October 2008 to September 2009, was also included in the regression equations to
account for the unusual decline in economic activity which took place during the global
financial crisis. All equations were also estimated with a constant.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Baseline Model
Aggregate Model
While we aim to examine the impact of commodity price shocks on sectoral production in
Canada, we begin our analysis by assessing the impact of these shocks on key Canadian
macroeconomic variables for the economy as a whole. Figure 1.3 shows the response of
aggregate output, inflation, interest rate, and the exchange rate to a one standard deviation
shock to commodity prices.
On impact, aggregate output falls in response to the commodity price shock, but be-
gins to rise immediately thereafter and continues to do so until it peaks in the ninth
month. This fall in production may be due to an initial decline in economic activity in the
non-commodity producing sectors of the economy, which is not fully offset by the higher
production levels of the commodity producing sectors.
Inflation increases contemporaneously in response to higher commodity prices, but de-
clines in subsequent periods, and by about the tenth month, has returned to baseline. The
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relatively rapid return of inflation to pre-shock levels quite likely reflects two complemen-
tary factors. Firstly, the appreciation of the exchange rate which results in lower prices for
imported goods and thus lower inflation levels, and secondly, rising interest rates which
serves to reduce demand and dampen the associated inflationary pressures. Figure 1.3 also
shows that interest rates initially increase in response to the commodity price shock, as
the monetary authority attempts to anchor inflationary expectations.
Figure 1.3: Aggregate Responses to a Commodity Price Shock
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Notes: The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path, which is the baseline. Blue lines are
the impulse response estimates. Blue areas are 68 percent probability intervals about the impulse response
point estimates.
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The exchange rate initially appreciates in response to the commodity price shock and
continues to do so before peaking at month five. This response is statistically significant
over the entire impulse horizon, and reinforces the result of the strong relationship between
commodity prices and exchange rate movements which have been found for Canada in
previous studies, (see for example Chen and Rogoff (2003)).
Production Sectors
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show how different industries respond to the commodity price shock.
Consistent with the decline in aggregate output on impact, manufacturing output also
declined on impact. It then begins to rise, until reaching its peak approximately five
months after the initial shock. Manufacturing output declines from this point onwards,
and falls below its baseline level twelve months after the shock, remaining below this level
even after four years. These responses are statistically significant over the impulse horizon
and offers evidence that the manufacturing industry in Canada is negatively affected by
rising commodity prices. Similar results for the UK manufacturing sector were found by
Guidi (2010).
Rising commodity prices may negatively impact the manufacturing sector in two re-
spects. Firstly, if commodities are an important input into the production process of
manufacturing firms, then higher costs for these inputs, either have to be absorbed by the
firm,23 thereby reducing profits, or passed on to the consumer, which is likely to reduce
demand and therefore sales. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in the Canadian
context, rising commodity prices lead to an appreciating exchange rate (see Figure 1.3).
23In which case, rising commodity prices is expected to have a smaller absolute effect on manufacturing
output.
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Since a significant portion of Canada’s manufactured goods are exported,24 this raises the
price of Canada’s manufactured exports and thus reduces foreign demand,25 resulting in a
contraction of output.
Figure 1.4: Production Sector Responses to a Commodity Price Shock
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Notes: The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path, which is the baseline. Blue lines are
the impulse response estimates. Blue areas are 68 percent probability intervals about the impulse response
point estimates.
24Approximately 42 percent of total manufacturing production is exported (see Table 1.2).
25Domestic demand may also fall since imported manufactured items, which are a substitute for the
domestically produced ones, will also be cheaper to purchase, and thus domestic consumers may engage
in expenditure switching towards the foreign item.
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In contrast to the manufacturing sector, Figure 1.4 shows that the commodity producing
sectors of the economy rise unequivocally in response to the positive commodity price shock,
with the greatest impact occurring about ten months after the shock. The lower panel of
Figure 1.4 disaggregates this response into the two component comprising the commodity
sector - Agriculture, forestry and fishing and Mining and quarrying.
Unlike the mining sector, which rises immediately following the shock, agriculture be-
gins to rise in earnest only after the fifth month, and becomes statistically significant from
month twelve onwards. Output in the mining sector, however, immediately displays a
sharp rise and continues to do so, though at a slower pace, eventually peaking at 0.15 per-
cent higher than it otherwise would have been in the absence of the shock. Also, whereas
output in the mining sector peaks at around month ten, output in the agricultural sector,
peaks almost two years after the initial shock. This reflects differences in the underlying
nature of the two industries. While mining operations can increase output fairly quickly
in response to positive price signals, by bringing into operation previously idle mines, or
increasing the intensity of operation at currently open mines (given that they were not
operating close to or at full capacity), an increase in agricultural output will necessitate
waiting on the appropriate growing season and growing period.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the response of the non-tradable sector to the positive commodity
price shock. As with manufacturing, output in this sector, declines on impact, but rises
thereafter. However, unlike manufacturing, this sector does not experience a decline below
its baseline level. The figure also shows the response of the three major sub-categories
of this sector - Utilities, Construction and Services, which for ease of analyses has been
further broken down into Personal Services, Business Services and Goods Distribution.
With respect to Services, there was a decline on impact for all three sub-sectors and this
contributed significantly to the decline which was observed for the non-tradable sector as
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Figure 1.5: Non-Tradable Sector Responses to a Commodity Price Shock
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whole on impact of the shock. The response of Personal Services, which includes education
and accommodation, was significant over the entire forecast horizon, suggesting that higher
commodity prices positively impact the balance sheet of households, which contributes to
higher demand for these services and consequently, higher real sectoral output. This has
often been cited as the wealth effect of higher commodity prices on Canadian households,
as the higher commodity price, essentially represents a positive income shock, such that
households feel more secure, thereby spending more and stimulating demand for these
services. Business services26 also rose in response to the commodity price shock, however
this result was not statistically significant.
Goods distribution, which includes the sectors of wholesale, retail and transportation,
increased as well in response to the commodity price shock. The significance of the response
however, dissipated after the tenth month, as it returned to its baseline level. The initial
decline for this sub-sector may be attributable to the fact that commodities are a significant
intermediate input in the production processes of firms in this sector. At the same time,
however, the output of this sub-sector is utilised by commodity producing firms, thus the
initial negative effect of higher input prices is offset by higher demand for their output.
A similar situation also prevails in the construction sector, although the response here is
much more pronounced and significant, relative to the goods distribution sector. Output in
the construction sector rises significantly in response to the commodity price shock, being
approximately 0.2 percent higher up to ten months after the shock. The output of this
sector is utilised heavily by companies in the mining sector, and so as output in the mining
sector goes up, there may also be increased demand for the output of this sector, as the
construction of new mining sites take place. Robust economic activity, resulting in greater
26Business services includes the sectors of Information, Finance, Real Estate, Professional Services,
Management and Administration
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business and personal wealth, may also lead to greater demand for houses and corporate
structures, thereby bolstering demand for the construction sector.
The increase in utilities in response to the commodity price shock may appear puz-
zling at first glance, since a significant input into the production of utilities is energy
commodities.27 However, although energy commodities are an input into the production
of utilities, utilities are also used by firms engaged in the production of both agricultural
and industrial commodities. Thus, as these primary commodity producing firms increase
output in response to the positive price signal, they also demand a greater amount of
utilities, thereby resulting in higher output in the utility sector as well. All industries of
the economy need electricity to operate, either directly or indirectly. Thus, when these
sectors respond positively to the commodity price shock, consumption of utilities will also
increase.
Variance Decompositions
The previous two sections showed that commodity price shocks can have a meaningful
impact on the Canadian economy. To further assess this relationship, the forecast error
variance decomposition can be investigated.28 While the impulse response functions cap-
ture the dynamic response of the endogenous variables to a commodity price shock and
consequently show the effects of that shock on the adjustment path of the variables, the
27According to Statistics Canada, this sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating
electric, gas and water utilities. These establishments generate, transmit, control and distribute electric
power; distribute natural gas; treat and distribute water; operate sewer systems and sewage treatment
facilities; and provide related services, generally through a permanent infrastructure of lines, pipes and
treatment and processing facilities.
28Forecast error variance decompositions specify the proportion of the forecasting error of a variable, at
a given horizon, that is due to a particular shock. Decomposition results are derived from the coefficients
of the moving average representation of the VAR system in conjunction with the variance of the shock
under consideration.
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variance decomposition divides the variation in the endogenous variables into that which
is attributable to the various structural shocks of the model. As a result, we are able to
obtain an estimate of the quantitative importance of each structural shock in driving the
dynamics of the particular endogenous variable. Both the IRFs and variance decomposi-
tion are useful in assessing how shocks to the endogenous variables propagate throughout
the system, and together they allow us to better assess the pass-through of external shocks
to the economic variables. Examining the variance decomposition in particular, allows us
to determine if commodity price shocks are an important source of Canadian macroeco-
nomic volatility. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report the variance decompositions for the aggregate
and industry models, respectively.
Table 1.3 shows that commodity price shocks contribute significantly to the variability
of Canadian macro-variables, most notably to inflation and the exchange rate. For inflation,
commodity price shocks explain, on average, 12 percent of the variability and is the third
most important factor contributing to inflation volatility after inflation’s own shock and
shocks to trading partner inflation. For the exchange rate, the impact of a commodity
price shock is even more pronounced, as this shock explains approximately 30 percent
of exchange rate variability at all horizons.29 The impact of commodity price shocks on
aggregate output and interest rates, however, are less marked, contributing on average 3
percent and 4 percent respectively.
Table 1.4 illustrate that commodity price shocks explain a reasonable amount of the
variability of industry variables, particularly at longer horizons. This is especially evident
for the non-tradable sectors of the economy, where this shock contributes more than 10
percent of the variability for Utilities, Construction and Personal Services at the four year
29The only other significant factor in explaining exchange rate volatility, are shocks to the exchange
rate itself.
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Table 1.3: Variance Decomposition - Aggregate Variables
Variables
Horizons (months)
6 12 24 32 48
Aggregate Output 2.7324 3.5273 3.1915 2.9943 2.8868
Inflation 12.2421 12.2375 12.2420 12.2471 12.2539
Interest Rate 3.3555 4.6018 4.5407 4.3197 3.9952
Exchange Rate 31.3208 33.9414 33.4324 32.1835 29.5524
Each cell in the table shows the percentage of variance explained by the commodity price shock, at
the indicated horizon.
horizon. Almost 6 percent of the variability of the manufacturing industry is also explained
by shocks to commodity prices at this horizon. For the commodity producing sectors, com-
modity price shocks explain an increasing amount of the forecast error variance, reaching
a modest proportion of about 4 percent at the longest horizon. These sectors, however,
are primarily influenced by their own shocks, shocks to foreign output and shocks to the
interest rate. This result is not unreasonable, given that much of their output is exported
to the foreign economy (see Table 1.2) and firms in these industries are often engaged in
financial contracts, which are sensitive to interest rate movements.30 Commodity price
shocks explain little of the variance of the other industries in the economy.
30These firms often have significant debt, due to the high cost of capital investment, which are tied to
interest rates prevailing in the economy.
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Table 1.4: Variance Decomposition - Industry Variables
Industry
Horizons (months)
6 12 24 32 48
Agriculture 0.0559 0.5338 2.6459 3.7859 4.6956
Mining 0.8262 2.0595 3.3395 3.6303 3.8663
Manufacturing 1.7388 1.3900 2.4616 3.8937 5.9481
Utilities 0.8366 2.8140 6.7220 8.3639 10.0538
Construction 4.3390 6.8424 8.7480 9.4504 10.2301
Business Services 0.0436 0.0856 0.5719 0.9110 1.3154
Personal Services 1.8925 4.7103 8.8454 10.1662 11.3023
Goods Distribution 2.7530 2.7303 2.4513 2.3871 2.3349
Each cell in the table shows the percentage of variance explained by the commodity price shock, at
the indicated horizon.
1.5.2 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis
Output: Aggregate versus Sectoral Models
Since a separate VAR is estimated for each sector of the economy, one may be interested to
check the relationship of our sectoral models with the aggregate model. To examine whether
the results from our sectoral models are consistent with those obtained from the aggregate
model, we compare these responses in Figure 1.6. In this figure, the output responses of
the various sectoral models have been aggregated, with each sector’s output weighted by its
mean share of total output over the sample period. As can be seen, the results are fairly
consistent. The commodity price shock triggers a decline of output on impact in both
cases. Responses over the impulse horizon is also similar, although the response from the
aggregated sectoral model does remain above that for the aggregate model.This difference
however is not statistically significant, as it still lies within the confidence bands of the
aggregate model.
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Figure 1.6: Output - Aggregate vs. Sectoral Models
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Robustness Checks: Aggregate Model
In this section we examine the robustness of our results to various changes in the specifi-
cation of the model. The alternative model specifications examined include, changing the
index used to represent commodity prices. These are reported in Panel A of Figure 1.7.
Here, both the Non-Fuel and Fuel sub-index of the total commodity price index are used.
A measure of the terms-of-trade as well as the real commodity price index is also used.31
In Panel B of Figure 1.7 we report the results of changing the ordering of commodity prices
in the foreign block of the model as well as that of increasing the number of lags in the
model. While lag selection tests suggested the use of two lags, it was also possible to use
alternative lag lengths. In alternative ordering 1, 2 and 3, commodity prices is ordered
before foreign output, inflation, and interest rate respectively, in the identification scheme,
31It is often argued that Canada’s economic fortunes are significantly impacted by changes to it’s terms
of trade. As used in the paper, the terms-of-trade is calculated as the ratio of total merchandise exports
to total merchandise imports. This measure therefore, captures more than just changes to the price of
commodity exports. The real commodity price index is obtained by dividing the nominal index by the US
consumer price index.
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whereas in the baseline, commodity prices is ordered last.
Figure 1.7: Responses of Aggregate Output to a Commodity Price Shock
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Notes: Nofuel - Commodity price index which excludes fuel prices; Fuel - Commodity price index with
only fuel prices; ToT - Trade of Terms index; Real CPI - Real Commodity Price Index; Alt 1,2,3 -
Alternative Identification Scheme 1,2,3; 3(4) Lags - Model with 3 (4) lags
The response of aggregate output to the commodity price shock under the various
scenarios is fairly similar. The difference between the baseline and the real CPI are virtually
indistinguishable, suggesting that the baseline results are not unduly affected by nominal
concerns. The response using the Fuel and Non-Fuel sub-indices are also similar to that
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obtained under the baseline, though the peak responses are lower. In the case of aggregate
output therefore, this would suggest that studies which focus exclusively on fuel prices may
provide estimates which are only a lower bound for the response of output to a commodity
price shock. Studies which employ a broader measure of commodity prices however, may
capture more dynamic and complete responses. On impact, the terms-of-trade measure
shows a positive response to the price shock, relative to the baseline which reflects a decline
on impact. The terms-of-trade response is also somewhat more persistent, even-tough its
peak response is lower.
With respect to the alternative identification schemes, all three offer a similar response
to the commodity price shock. Relative to the baseline, they imply a somewhat larger
response of aggregate output to the price shock, however, by two years the differences
in responses are virtually indistinguishable. Changing the lag order also results in higher
peak responses compared to the baseline. This is particularly evident when 4 lags are used.
However, even in this case, all responses have converged to the baseline by year four.
Robustness Checks: Sectoral Models
The response of output in each sector to the commodity price shock under the various
scenarios outlined in the previous section, are presented in Figure A.2 of Appendix A.
Generally, the response of the various sectors are similar to that observed for aggregate
output, and as such we will just examine a few areas in which they differ.
The sectoral response to both the Fuel and Non-Fuel sub-indices are similar to those
observed for aggregate output. However, in the case of the Commodity sector, represented
in the right panel of sub-graph (a), we see that contrary to the baseline, when only the
Non-Fuel sub-index is used, commodity output actually declines the first few months after
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the price shock, before starting to increase from month three onwards. This reflects a
decline in both the Agricultural and Mining sectors. These initial declines however, are
not statistically significant and may reflect the use of non-energy inputs in the production
of output for these sectors.32 Higher prices for these inputs may result in the initial declines
observed. Similar initial declines are observed for Personal Services andUtilities, when the
Non-Fuel sub-index is used, but again these declines are not statistically significant.33
As with aggregate output, the use of the Real Commodity Price Index produced vir-
tually indistinguishable results from the baseline case in the sectoral models. In general,
the use of the Terms-of-Trade index, produced results that imply a somewhat smaller out-
put response over the impulse horizon relative to the baseline. This suggests that direct
price shocks to commodities exported by Canada might have a greater impact on sectoral
output, than does changes in the terms of trade, which also factors in import price changes.
With respect to employing alternative identifying assumptions, the various sectoral
responses are generally in-line with the baseline case. Of all the sectors considered however,
Utilities was the most sensitive to these ordering assumptions. For Utilities, all three
alternative orderings, resulted in a larger increase in output on impact, than that observed
in the baseline case. The peak response also occurred much sooner than the baseline, at
approximately four months. By month thirty however, the responses are virtually identical
to the baseline.
Increasing the lag lengths did not significantly alter the response of sectoral outputs
to the commodity price shock. The model with three lags was generally consistent with
32The effect in the mining sector is not significant over the entire impulse horizon, whereas the effect
on agricultural output does not become significant until after the 27th month, at which point agricultural
output is increasing.
33The effect for Personal Services becomes significant only after month nine and for Utilities, after one
year.
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the baseline result. For most sectors, the model with four lags produced a higher peak
response, but generally returned to the baseline level by the eight month. These larger
number of lags could be allowing the model to capture more interactions between sectoral
output and the commodity price shock, thus accounting for the higher peak responses. The
baseline therefore, with two lags, may a represent a lower bound on the effect of commodity
price shocks on output.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates the impact of commodity price shocks on Canadian economic activ-
ity. In addition to examining the aggregate impact, we also sought to examine how these
shocks affected sectoral production. In order to do so, we employed a structural vector
autoregressive model, identified using a recursive ordering approach and utilising a block
exogeneity assumption. The sectoral impact of commodity price shocks has not been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature and so represents an area in which we contribute to the
current literature. This is important as we find that the effect of the commodity price shock
on aggregate output masks significant differences in responses across industries. Thus a
failure to account for differential sectoral responses could result in policy actions that if
not appropriately targeted, may be beneficial to some industries, while causing harm to
others.
Our analysis reveals that commodity price shocks play a significant role in positively
impacting the output of Commodity producing sectors within the economy. In contrast,
over the medium to long term, the Manufacturing sector is negatively affected by increases
in commodity prices. Output in the Non-Tradable sector, though declining on impact,
rises thereafter and does not experience a decline below its baseline level, as was observed
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for Manufacturing.
With respect to other aggregate variables of interest, we find that domestic inflation
rises in response to positive commodity price shocks. This impact however, does not last
very long, and the relatively quick return to baseline probably reflects the actions of policy
makers, as interest rates also increase significantly to moderate inflationary pressures. The
strong positive correlation between commodity prices and the exchange rate, which has
been reported in other studies, was also found in the current study.
Our findings are generally invariant to a range of robustness checks, including the
use of alternative ordering assumptions, changing the lag lengths and employing different
measures for the commodity price shock. These findings suggest that overall, commodity
prices are an important source of disturbances that affect Canadian economic performance.
While the analysis undertaken thus far represents a useful first step to understanding
the sectoral impact of these changes within Canada, it is possible to extend this work.
For example, alternative identification mechanisms, such as long-run or sign restrictions,
may also be employed to identify the commodity price shock. Additionally, one may
also attempt to further disentangle the relationship between specific commodity prices and
sectoral output. Such extensions would serve to further elaborate upon the results reported
here and may be worth exploring in future research.
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Chapter 2
Commodity Prices in a Multi-Sector
DSGE Model of the Canadian
Economy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyse in more detail the transmission mechanisms that can explain
the dynamics observed in the VAR examined in chapter one. This analysis is based on a
micro-founded approach, where a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
is employed. The model described in this chapter is a slightly modified version of the DSGE
model developed by Dib (2008). Dib’s model is a small open economy New Keynesian
model with several features which are standard in the literature. It also encapsulates some
elements which are specific to the Canadian economy, such as a commodity-producing
and exporting sector. It also contains a tradable manufacturing sector and a non-tradable
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sector, which is comprised primarily of services.
While our study differs in terms of topic of interest and question of focus, the method-
ology we employ is similar to Dib. The modifications we make to the model include
(i) removing monopolistic competition in the labour market, (ii) adding a scaling factor
to hours worked, (iii) adding a permanent productivity process, (iv) incorporating price-
stickiness via Rotemberg, rather than the Calvo-Yun mechanism, (v) incorporating local
currency pricing rather than producer currency pricing, (vi) relaxing the law of one price
in the commodity sector, to allow for short-run deviations and (vii) modelling the foreign
economy as a three equation system, rather than as AR(1) processes. These changes were
made either to increase the tractability of the model and make it easier to solve, given its
fairly complex nature or to incorporate some real-world features into the model, without
again making it overly complicated.
As was illustrated in chapter one, commodity prices can have a significant impact on
the Canadian economy and it is useful for policy to know the mechanisms behind the
impact. Work in this area is therefore motivated by Canada’s experience with respect
to commodity price movements in recent history. More specifically, since the beginning of
2002, commodity prices have been rising and this has been accompanied by an appreciation
of the Canadian dollar and an increasing share of commodities in total exports, but since
2008 there has been a notable fall in these prices, with the consequent knock-on effects.
The decline in commodity prices following the global financial crisis also brought with it
significant questions about the ability of the Canadian economy to withstand these shocks
and has spurred renew interest in Canada’s economic resilience.
This paper quantitatively highlights the role of commodity price shocks in affecting
Canada’s macro variables with special emphasis on the sectoral impact of these shocks.
This focus on the sectoral impact is generally absent from the literature, with the working
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DSGE models employed by the Central Bank, being the notable exception. The Central
Bank’s models, of course, are necessarily larger and more complicated than the one ex-
amined in this thesis. However the present paper fills an important gap in the literature,
as a tractable model is employed, which though simpler, still captures the salient features
of a multi-sectoral commodity exporting small open economy and allows for meaningful
analysis of relevant questions, such as, what are the differential sectoral impacts of rising
commodity prices? The multi-sectoral structure of the model is also important, especially
for an economy such as Canada, that is susceptible to international shocks - for example,
commodity price shocks - which are largely sectoral in nature. This framework therefore
offers a more realistic economic environment for Canada and thus can be used to assess if
commodity price shocks are an important source of economic fluctuations in the Canadian
context.
The DSGE modelling framework is also quite useful for conducting scenario analysis.
This functionality has been highlighted by Smets and Wouters (2003), who note that these
models provide a coherent theoretical framework within which to assess the likely impact
of the realisation of certain risks as well as the wide range of policy responses available.
When employed in this way, this class of model possess an advantage over simpler reduced-
form time series models, such as vector auto-regressions, in that they make transparent
the economic mechanisms at work within the model. In employing the model to study
the policy response of the Central Bank when confronted with declining commodity prices
during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), this study is among the few to evaluate this
response using a DSGE analysis.
Though several studies have looked at unconventional monetary policy during the pe-
riod of the GFC (see Gambacorta et al. (2014), Neely (2015), Fratzscher et al. (2016),
Hamilton and Wu (2012)), very few have examined the impact of reducing interest rate to
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its effective lower bound in the Canadian context1 and sought to quantify the macroeco-
nomic effect of this specific policy action. Additionally, some of the previous analysis was
largely qualitative in nature, (see BIS (2008), Zorn et al. (2009) for example) and much of it
focused on the U.S. or European countries (see Stock and Watson (2012), Baumeister and
Benati (2013), Wu and Xia (2016), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)). The
Canadian response in terms of lower interest rates has been largely unaddressed in the lit-
erature, and our paper is the first to assess the sectoral impact of this policy action within
a DSGE framework as previous DSGE models of Canada have not been applied to address
this issue.2 The present paper thus represents a useful contribution to the literature.
Our results suggest that just examining the aggregate effects of commodity price shocks
on Canadian macroeconomic variables, may not present a very clear picture as very im-
portant sectoral differences are concealed by the aggregate figures. A rise in commodity
prices has an uneven impact on sectoral output, even-though aggregate output increases.
As expected, there is a rise of output in the commodity producing sector. Output in the
non-tradable sector also rises initially, but then experiences a slight decline, whereas out-
put in the manufacturing sector declines on impact and remains below its steady state
level, even after five years. The results of the counter-factual policy exercises also reveal
that actions taken by the Central Bank were able to prevent a more protracted decline in
economic activity following the drop in commodity prices during the GFC, however had
these policies been adopted sooner, the results could have been even better.
1The effective lower bound is considered to be 0.25% by the Bank of Canada, see Zorn et al. (2009).
2Dib (2003) for example, developed a DSGE model for Canada which lacked the sectoral nature, and
also never examined the response of monetary policy in the context of a real-world commodity price shock.
Dib et al. (2008) also employed a DSGE framework to undertake welfare analysis. Other papers focused on
estimating the equilibrium interest rates for Canada in the DSGE framework (Lam and Tkacz 2004) and
Murchison et al. (2004) developed a DSGE model to understand the dynamic relationships in Canadian
macroeconomic data, but again, did not assess the monetary policy response to an actual commodity price
shock.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 briefly examines the
literature relevant to the current area of research. The description of the model is presented
in section 2.3. Section 2.4 outlines the model parametrization process and section 2.5
examines the results. Section 2.6 discuses some policy implications of these results and
section 2.7 offers some concluding remarks.
2.2 Review of the Literature
As highlighted in chapter one, a number of papers have examined the relationship between
commodity prices and the Canadian economy, with emphasis largely focused on energy
prices. Unlike chapter one, however, the current chapter is related to previous studies that
employ New Keynesian open economy models to examine the impact of shocks on the evo-
lution of the macro-economy. Numerous such studies have been done in the international
context, however, with specific reference to Canada, the literature is much more limited.
Mendoza (1995) is one of the earliest studies to examine the impact of terms of trade
shocks. These shocks, in the Canadian context are often attributed to movements in
commodity prices. Mendoza’s study incorporated both developing and developed countries,
including Canada. He found that terms of trade shocks were an important source for
driving business cycles and argued that almost 50 percent of the variability in output could
be attributed to these shocks. DePratto et al. (2009) also estimated a New Keynesian
general-equilibrium open economy model for Canada, the Unites States and the United
Kingdom, to examine how changes in oil prices affected the macro-economy.3 They found
that in general, energy prices affected the economy primarily through the supply side, as
3The authors did not develop a full DSGE model, but rather employed a structure similar to Gali
(2008) as the basis for their empirical model.
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the demand-side effects were not substantial. They also found that higher oil prices had a
temporary negative effect on both the output gap and on trend growth, which translated
into a permanently lower level of potential and actual output. No evidence was found to
support the notion that oil price changes had an asymmetric effect on the economy.
Dissou (2007) utilised a forward-looking dynamic general equilibrium model to assess
the impact of a sustained increase in energy prices on the Canadian economy.4 He con-
cluded that a permanent 20 percent increase in world oil prices resulted in a 0.4 percent
increase in aggregate output above its baseline level. In a more recent paper by McKen-
zie and Carbone (2016), the authors employed a similar computable general equilibrium
(CGE) framework, and found that in steady-state, a 10 percent reduction in oil prices
resulted in a 1 percent decline in national output for Canada. While both these models
employed a general equilibrium framework, they did not utilise the dynamic stochastic
New Keynesian modelling techniques which have become the standard in the literature.
Such a framework is exploited in the current paper.
The most complete and fully-specified DSGE model currently in use to capture the
dynamics of the Canadian economy, is that employed by the Bank of Canada. The terms
of trade economic model (ToTEM), is a state-of-the-art open-economy DSGE model, which
is more richly specified than the one considered here.5 The main features of the model are
outlined in Murchison and Rennison (2006). ToTEM was later updated and revised to
4The model was calibrated based on the structure of the Canadian economy as illustrated in the social
accounting matrix (SAM) for 2002.
5ToTEM is the end result of several rounds of model developments which have been undertaken at
the Bank of Canada over several decades. This started with the small annual model (SAM), which was
a small scale theoretical model of about 25 equations, that was really more geared towards answering
specific policy questions, rather than providing a coherent structure of the economy. SAM was eventually
replaced by the quarterly projection model (QPR) over the period 1993 - 2005. This model built on SAM,
but also featured model-determined asset prices among other significant improvements. ToTEM, the most
recent evolution of the Bank’s forecasting and policy models, extends the capabilities of QPM but also
incorporates optimizing behaviour for the model’s agents, both in and out of steady state.
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include financial linkages to the real economy and this updated version is referred to as
ToTEM II (see Dorich et al. (2013)).6 The onset of the global financial crisis in particular,
highlighted the need for the inclusion of these financial frictions, so as to capture the
additional channels through which shocks may affect the real economy.
Despite the existence of ToTEM, a model such as the one examined here, still fills an
important gap in the literature. This is so because it presents a tractable, easily under-
standable and readily available model (the Central Bank model is really only accessible to
staff at the Bank) which would be useful to the business sector in general, and financial
firms in particular. These are entities that would be interested in carrying out scenario
analysis and producing forecasts for the macro-economy that are based on a set of inter-
nally consistent assumptions about the underlying structure of the Canadian economy and
is premised on a clearly articulated and easily understood micro foundation.
In the international context, several models have been developed for the US and Euro
area. The Australian Central Bank, also relatively recently began the utilisation of DSGE
models in their forecasting and policy exercises. Among the papers published for Australia,
these include studies by Jaaskela and Nimark (2011) and Rees et al. (2016). Jaaskela and
Nimark (2011) found that both foreign and domestic shocks were important drivers of the
Australian business cycle, while Rees et al. (2016) highlight the importance of resource price
shocks. They found that higher resource prices increased domestic income, resulting in a
sustained expansion in the domestic economy and an appreciation of the real exchange
rate. The model also suggested that resource price shocks did not play a great role in
explaining the volatility of most Australian macroeconomic variables, with the exception
of export growth, interest rates and the nominal exchange rate.
An important concern is that commodity price shocks may affect developing countries
6This updated version, replaced ToTEM in June 2011.
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differently. For Chile, Medina and Soto (2007) estimated a DSGE model with nominal and
real rigidities, to describe the sources of business cycle fluctuations in Chile. This model
was later extended by Fornero and Kirchner (2014) and Fornero et al. (2014) and used to
specifically analyse the impact of commodity price shocks in Chile. Their results suggested
that the effect of commodity price increases was expansionary, and that this expansion was
largely driven by the positive responses of investment in the commodity sector which then
spilled over to the non-commodity producing sectors of the economy. Similarly, for Russia,
Malakhovskaya and Minabutdinov (2014) developed a New Keynesian DSGE model which
they used to assess the importance of commodity price shocks for the Russian economy.
They found that despite a strong impact on GDP from the commodity price shock, business
cycles in Russia were primarily driven by domestic factors.
This paper builds on and complements the existing literature which investigates the
macroeconomic effects of commodity price shocks. This is achieved by employing the
DSGE modelling framework, which has become standard in the literature, but includes
sectoral disaggregation, which is absent from many of the papers cited. Table 2.1 briefly
summarises some of the studies which have employed a General Equilibrium (GE) frame-
work to examine the relationship between macroeconomic activity and commodity price
shocks, both in the Canadian and international context.
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Table 2.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (GE Models)
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Canada
Murchison et
al.
(2006)
Not stated 1980 - 2004 fully calibrated
DSGE model
There is a significant
and sustained increase in
consumption in response
to a commodity price
shock. Additionally, the
exchange rate appreciates,
inflation rises and there is
an increase in aggregate
output.
Dissou
(2007)
data from the Canadian
input-output table,
national accounts, trade
statistics and government
accounts
calibrated to 2002
data
calibrated CGE
model
A permanent 20 percent
increase in world oil prices
resulted in a 0.4 per-
cent increase in aggregate
output above its baseline
level.
Dorich et al.
(2013)
consumption (personal
expenditures), residential
investment (residential
construction), business
investment, inventory
investment (total business
inventories), government
spending (government
expenditure), exports and
imports, core CPI,
short-term interest rates,
fiscal variables, foreign
variables, NFA, CAB,
commodity prices,
exchange rates
1980Q1 - 2012Q2 DSGE model
estimated using a
Covariance Matrix
Adaptation
Evolution Strategy
(CMA-ES)
algorithm to
maximise the
likelihood
Results were qualitatively
similar to those obtained
in Murchison and Renni-
son (2006), thought they
tended to be smaller in
magnitude. ”Overall, our
simulation suggests that,
regardless of the source
of the commodity price
shock, the effects are, on
net, positive, since gross
domestic income, wealth
and GDP all rise. In
all cases, the Canadian
dollar appreciates, but its
adverse impact on manu-
facturing exports is par-
tially offset by the reduced
costs of imported produc-
tion inputs.”
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Table 2.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (GE Models) Cont’d
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
McKenzie
et al.
(2016)
Input-output tables for
Canada
calibrated to 2007
data
Static multi-sector,
multi-region CGE
model (calibrated)
A 10 percent reduction in
oil prices results in a 1 per-
cent reduction in national
output.
Other Developed Countries
Jaaskela et
al.
(2011)
Inflation, consumption,
exchange rate,
employment, nonfarm
GDP, imports, exports,
world GDP, commodity
price inflation,
commodity demand
1993Q2 - 2007Q3 estimated DSGE
(Bayesian)
Both foreign and domestic
shocks are important con-
tributors to the Australian
business cycle. Commod-
ity demand shocks had
the largest impact on ex-
port growth, explaining
approximately 25 percent
of its variance.
Rees et al.
(2016)
Australian GDP,
consumption, investment,
public demand, resource
exports, non-resource
exports, sectoral output,
headline inflation,
sectoral inflation,
commodity prices,
domestic interest rate,
foreign inflation, interest
rate and GDP
1992Q1 - 2013Q4 estimated DSGE
(Bayesian)
Higher commodity prices
had an expansionary ef-
fect on the domestic econ-
omy and resulted in an ap-
preciation of the real ex-
change rate. Commodity
price shocks, however, did
not play a large role in ex-
plaining the volatility of
most Australian macroe-
conomic variables.
Developing Countries
Fornero et al.
(2014)
GDP, commodity
production, consumption,
investment, government
consumption, headline
inflation, core inflation,
interest rate, exchange
rate, current account
balance, foreign output,
interest rate, inflation.
Emerging market bond
index
2001Q3-2013Q4 calibrated DSGE A large proportion of the
above-average growth of
investment in Chile be-
tween the period 2004 to
2010 was explained by
movements in commodity
prices. Thus, these price
fluctuations have been a
significant driving force of
the observed investment
cycle in Chile. price
shocks
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Table 2.1: Literature Survey -
Commodity Price Shocks and Economic Activity (GE Models) Cont’d
Authors Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Malakhovskaya
et al.
(2014)
private final consumption
expenditures per capita,
producer price index,
interest rate, wage, real
exchange rate, per capita
revenues from the export
of oil based commodities,
foreign inflation, interest
rate and output
1999Q3 - 2011Q3 estimated DSGE
(Bayesian)
Despite a strong impact
on GDP from the com-
modity price shock, busi-
ness cycles in Russia were
primarily driven by do-
mestic factors.
Multi-Country Studies
Mendoza
(1995)
GDP,
consumption,investment,
trade balance, terms of
trade, real exchange rate
1955 - 1990 for G-7
countries
1960 - 1990 for De-
veloping Countries
calibrated RBC Terms of trade shocks
account for nearly half
of actual GDP variabil-
ity. Terms of trade shocks
cause real appreciations
and positive interest rate
differentials.
DePratto et
al.
(2009)
Output growth, domestic
interest rate, exchange
rates, domestic inflation,
foreign interest rate,
output and inflation
1971Q1 - 2008Q1 semi-structural
New Keynesian
model estimated
by maximum
likelihood
Higher oil prices had a
temporary negative effect
on both the output gap
and on trend growth,
which translated into a
permanently lower level
of potential and actual
output.
2.3 Model Description
The benchmark set-up of the model closely follows the multi-sector open economy model
developed in Dib (2008) with a few modifications. The general overview of the model is
presented below, with the detailed model equations outlined in the accompanying technical
appendix B for the chapter. The model is composed of three types of economic units.
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These are households, firms and policy-makers. Households are perfectly competitive in
the labour market and derive utility from consumption.7 Savings and investment in the
economy is also undertaken by the households, who may purchase either domestic or foreign
bonds and invest in sector-specific capital stock.
Table 2.2: Firms in the Model
Firm Market Structure Inputs Used Uses of Output
Commodity Perfect Competition Labour, Capital,
Land
Manufacturing production
Non-tradable production
Exports
Non-Tradable Monopolistic Competition Labour, Capital,
Commodities
Final Good production
Manufacturing Monopolistic Competition Labour, Capital,
Commodities
Final Good production
Exports
Import Monopolistic Competition Foreign Im-
ported Good
Final Good production
Final Good Perfect Competition Non-tradable
good, Manu-
factured good,
Imported good
Consumption (HH & Gov’t)
Investment
The firms in the economy are divided into five sectors as illustrated in Table 2.2 - (i)
a perfectly competitive commodity-producing sector, (ii) a non-tradable goods producing
sector, (iii) a manufactured goods producing sector, (iv) an imports sector and (v) a final
domestic good producing sector. Manufacturing and non-tradable goods producing firms
employ the use of labour, capital and commodities in their production process. They
also posses some market power and thus can set prices for their output. Commodities
are produced by a perfectly competitive firm using labour, capital and land, which has
7Dib (2008) originally assumed monopolistic competition in the labour market. However, to increase
the tractability of the model, this assumption was dropped.
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a fixed exogenous supply.8 This firm has no pricing power, and thus takes the price of
commodities, which is determined in foreign markets, as a given. The imports sector
purchases foreign goods and sells them on the domestic market, with each firm selling
a differentiated product. The perfectly competitive domestic final good firm combines
the output of the non-tradable sector, the import sector and a fraction of the output
of the manufacturing sector to produce the final good. This final good is then used for
consumption or investment by households or for government expenditure. The fraction of
output produced by the commodities sector and the manufacturing sector, which is not
utilized domestically, is exported to foreign markets.
The monetary authority in the model adjusts nominal interest rate with the target of
stabilising the inflation rate and aggregate output. Whilst fiscal policy is modelled as an
exogenously determined spending process which is financed by the proceeds of lump-sum
taxation imposed on the households. A schematic overview of the model may be viewed
in section B.1 of technical appendix B.
2.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by h ∈ (0, 1), which obtain utility from con-
sumption, and disutility from labour effort.9 The representative household thus maximises
lifetime utility which is given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ξc,tln (Ch,t − dCh,t−1)− AL
H1+χh,t
1 + χ
}
(2.1)
8The presence of land in the production function of commodities, allows for the existence of more than
one tradable sector in equilibrium (see Bouakez et al. (2009)).
9Since in equilibrium all households will make the same choices and thus their aggregate(average)
optimal choices will coincide, we can drop the h subscript to increase the ease of exposition.
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where β is the discount factor, d is the parameter that controls habit persistence and
determines the weight that households place on previous consumption, χ is the inverse
of the Frisch labour supply elasticity and controls the responsiveness of hours worked to
changes in the real wage. Though not present in Dibs’ model, in the spirit of Adolfson
et al. (2007), AL is included as a scaling factor to ensure the compatibility of average hours
worked in the model with that observed in the data. ξc,t is a consumption preference shock
and follows a stationary autoregressive process.
The households labour bundle, Hh,t is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) com-
posite of labour supplied to each sector and is given by:
Hh,t =
[
H1+ςn,ht +H
1+ς
m,ht +H
1+ς
x,ht
] 1
1+ς
(2.2)
where Hn,ht, Hm,ht, Hx,ht signifies hours allocated by household h to the non-tradable (n),
manufacturing (m) and commodities sectors (x), respectively and ς denotes the willingness
of households to substitute labour across sectors.
Households are able to purchase domestic treasury bonds, Bht and also have access
to incomplete international financial markets in which they can trade bonds denominated
in foreign currency, B∗ht. In addition to labour, households also supply capital to firms
in the productive sectors.10 The profits of firms with market power, Γht, are remitted to
households, since it is assumed that households own equity in these firms. Households are
also assumed to own an endowment of land, L, which provides them with rental income
and to pay lump-sum taxes, Tht, to the government. The household may use its income
received to purchase new bonds (foreign or domestic), or to purchase some of the final
10The productive sectors in the model refer to the non-tradable, manufacturing and commodity pro-
ducing sectors.
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good which it then allocates between consumption goods or investment goods.
The nominal budget constraint of the household is therefore given by:
PtCht + PtIht +
Bht
Rt
+
stB
∗
ht
κtR∗t
≤
∑
j=n,m,x
(Rj,htKj,ht +Wj,htHj,ht)
+Bht−1 + stB∗ht−1 +Rl,tL+ Γht − Tht
(2.3)
where Pt is the price of the final good in the economy, Iht = In,ht + Im,ht + Ix,ht is total
investment by household h in the productive sectors, Rj,ht and Wj,ht are the rental rate of
capital and the wage rate in sector j = n,m, x, Rl,t is the rate of return on land, Rt and
R∗t are the gross nominal interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds respectively, Γht is
total profits remitted to household h and Tht are lump-sum transfers to the government. st
is the nominal exchange rate and κt is a country specific risk premium, which is positively
related to the amount of outstanding foreign debt and a risk shock, as outlined in equation
2.4. The risk shock, Ψt follows a stationary autoregressive process.
κt = exp
[
−κ
(
stB
∗
t
PtYt
)
+ Ψt
]
(2.4)
The sector-specific capital stock, evolves according to law of motion:
Kj,ht+1 = (1− δ)Kj,ht + Υt
[
1− Ft
(
Ij,ht
Ij,ht−1
)]
Ij,ht (2.5)
where δ is the depreciation rate which is common to all sectors. Ft represents the cost
of adjusting investment in sector j, that is, it represents the cost associated with turning
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investment into physical capital and takes the form F (·) = Φk
2
(
Ij,ht
Ij,ht−1
− µ
)2
.11 Υt is a sta-
tionary investment-specific shock which alters the rate at which investment is transformed
into productive capital (see Greenwood et al. (2000)).
The representative household, h, maximises utility, equation 2.1, subject to equations
2.3 and 2.5 to obtain the first-order conditions which are highlighted in appendix B.3.
2.3.2 Non-Tradable Sector
The non-tradable sector, indexed by n, consists of a continuum of intermediate-good pro-
ducing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The output of firm i is produced using capital, labour
and commodity inputs. Each firm then sells their output to a representative competitive
firm, who we refer to as the retailer. The retailer transforms the differentiated interme-
diate products into a homogeneous non-traded good which it then sells to the final good
producing firm. The composite non-traded good is produced by the retailer employing the
following constant elasticity of substitution technology:
Yn,t =
(∫ 1
0
(Yn,it)
θn−1
θn di
) θn
θn−1
(2.6)
where Yn,it is the output of firm i and θn controls the elasticity of substitution among the
output of the different non-traded firms. Optimization by the retailer yields the following
demand function for each firm’s output:
11The function Ft(·) satisfies the usual assumptions such that in steady state, the marginal cost of a
small adjustment to the rate of investment growth is zero, but that these costs rise substantially as the
desired change in investment becomes larger. This is formally represented as F (µ) = F ′(µ) = 0 and
F ′′(µ) > 0, where µ is the steady-state rate of productivity growth.
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Yn,it =
(
Pn,it
Pn,t
)−θn
Yn,t (2.7)
where Pn,it is the price of firm i’s output and Pn,t is the price of the composite non-traded
good. The production function of non-tradable firm i is given by:
Yn,it ≤ An,t (µtHn,it)αn (Kn,it)γn
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn
(2.8)
where Hn,it, Kn,it and Y
n
x,it are inputs of labour, capital, and commodities used by firm i
in its production process and αn, γn and 1 − αn − γn, the respective input shares. An,t
is a stationary, sector-specific technology shock, whilst µt is a stochastic trend in labour
productivity which evolves according to a random walk with drift.12
Unlike Dib (2008), who uses a Calvo - Yun mechanism (see Calvo (1983) and Yun
(1996)), price stickiness is incorporated in our model by assuming that firms face a quadratic
adjustment cost when changing prices, as initially conceptualized by Rotemberg (1982).13
Given this cost, firms choose prices and factor inputs to maximise real profits, where the
profit function is given by:
Γn,it =
Pn,itYn,it
Pt
− MCn,itYn,it
Pt
− τn
2
[
Pn,it
Πηn,t−1Π1−ηPn,it−1
− 1
]2
Pn,tYn,t
Pt
(2.9)
The quadratic adjustment cost term in squared brackets tells us that in changing its price
between period t−1 and t, the firm is able to account for the policymaker’s inflation target,
12This permanent productivity process was not included in Dib’s model, however this modification was
included here as the real economy does grow over time, and this allows us to capture that aspect of the
data.
13This change made it less complicated to model price stickiness. Although to a first order approxima-
tion, both methods yield similar results, the Rotemberg method was easier for us to implement.
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Π, as well as sector-specific inflation, Πn,t−1, before incurring a cost. MCn,it is the nominal
marginal cost faced by firm i, and is given by:
MCn,it =
εn,t
An,t
[
Wn,t
αnµt
]αn [Rn,t
γn
]γn [ Px,t
1− αn − γn
]1−αn−γn
(2.10)
where Px,t is the domestic currency price for commodities and εn,t is a stationary mark-up
shock that alters marginal costs in the non-tradable sector for reasons unrelated to changes
in factor costs.
2.3.3 Manufacturing Sector
The manufacturing sector, indexed by m, consists of a continuum of intermediate-good
producing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The output of firm i, which may be used domesti-
cally or exported, is produced using capital, labour and commodity inputs. In the domestic
market, each firm sells their output to a competitive retailer, who transforms the differ-
entiated intermediate products into a homogeneous manufactured good which it then sells
to the final good producer. In the export market, manufacturing firms sell their output to
an exporter, who transforms the differentiated intermediate products into a homogeneous
manufactured good which is exported. Firms are able to price discriminate between the
domestic and foreign market, and thus can set different prices for each. The composite
manufactured good is produced employing the CES production technology:
Y lm,t =
(∫ 1
0
(Ym,it)
θm−1
θm di
) θm
θm−1
for l ∈ {d, ex} (2.11)
where d indicates goods sold in the domestic market and ex, those which are exported.
Ym,it is the output of firm i and θm controls the elasticity of substitution among the output
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of the different manufacturing firms. Optimization by the retailer and exporter yields the
following demand functions for each firms output, for the relevant market:
Y dm,it =
(
Pm,it
Pm,t
)−θm
Y dm,t (2.12)
Y exm,it =
(
P ∗m,it
P ∗m,t
)−θm
Y exm,t (2.13)
where Pm,it and P
∗
m,it is the price of firm i’s output in the domestic and foreign markets,
respectively and Pm,t (P
∗
m,t) is the price of the domestic (foreign) composite manufactured
good. The production function of manufacturing firm i is given by:
Ym,it ≤ Am,t (µtHm,it)αm (Km,it)γm
(
Y mx,it
)1−αm−γm
(2.14)
where Hm,it, Km,it and Y
m
x,it are inputs of labour, capital, and commodities used by firm
i in its production process and αm, γm and 1 − αm − γm, the respective input shares.
Am,t is a stationary, manufacturing-specific technology shock which follows a first-order
autoregressive process (see equation 2.42).
As in the non-tradable sector, manufacturing firms face a quadratic adjustment cost
when changing prices. In particular, these costs are incurred in the currency of the market
in which the firm’s output is sold, so that prices are sticky in local currency terms. In
this regard, we modify Dib’s assumption of producer currency pricing (PCP) which allows
for a complete pass-through of the exchange rate to prices, and instead assume that firms
engage in local currency pricing (LCP), which may lead to lower pass-through of exchange
rate to import prices and thus temper the effects of exchange rate movements. 14 Given
14Under PCP, the law of one price always holds, however there have been some empirical studies which
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this cost, firms choose prices and factor inputs to maximise real profits, where the profit
function is given by:
Γm,it =
Pm,itY
d
m,it
Pt
+
stP
∗
m,itY
ex
m,it
Pt
− MC
d
m,itY
d
m,it
Pt
− MC
ex
m,itY
ex
m,it
Pt
− τm
2
[
Pm,it
Πηm,t−1Π1−ηPm,it−1
− 1
]2 Pm,tY dm,t
Pt
− τ
∗
m
2
[
P ∗m,it
(Π∗m,t−1)ηΠ1−ηP
∗
m,it−1
− 1
]2 stP ∗m,tY exm,t
Pt
(2.15)
MC lm,it is the nominal marginal cost faced by firm i in market l ∈ {d, ex}, and is given by:
MC lm,it =
εlm,t
Am,t
[
Wm,t
αmµt
]αm [Rm,t
γm
]γm [ Px,t
1− αm − γm
]1−αm−γm
(2.16)
where εlm,t is a stationary mark-up shock.
While the domestic demand for manufactured goods, Y dm,t, is the result of agent’s opti-
mising behaviour in the model, we assume that foreign demand for manufactured exports,
Y exm,t, is given by:
Y exm,t = ω
∗
(
P ∗m,t
P ∗t
)−ν∗
Y ∗t (2.17)
where Y ∗t and P
∗
t is the foreign output and price level, respectively. The elasticity of
demand by foreigners for domestic manufactured output is given by −ν∗ and the parameter
ω∗ governs the share of manufactured exports in total foreign expenditure.
show that this is not always the case, particularly in the short-run (see Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Edison
and Fisher (1991) for example). Thus, utilizing LCP allows us to account for this temporary deviation
from the law of one price in the short-run.
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2.3.4 Commodity Sector
The commodity sector, indexed by x, produces a homogeneous output under perfect com-
petition. Given these conditions, the sector can be viewed as consisting of a single firm
that produces output according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yx,t ≤ Ax,t (µtHx,t)αx (Kx,t)γx (µtL)1−αx−γx (2.18)
where Hx,t, Kx,t and L are inputs of labour, capital, and land used to produce the com-
modity output and αx, γx and 1−αx−γx, the respective input shares. Ax,t is a stationary,
sector-specific technology shock which follows a first-order autoregressive process.
The commodity producing firm is a price-taker and thus selects the amount of capital
and labour input, each period so as to maximise profits which is given by:
Γx,t = Px,tYx,t −Wx,tHx,t −Rx,tKx,t −Rl,tL (2.19)
where Px,t is the domestic currency price of commodities.
The foreign currency price of commodities, P ∗x,t, is entirely determined in world markets
and remains unaffected by domestic economic developments. For this sector, the law of
one price (LOP) is assumed to hold in the long run. However, in contrast to Dib, we
allow for deviations from LOP in the short-run. In particular, we allow for a delay in the
pass-through of foreign currency commodity price changes to the domestic currency price
which the commodity producing firm receives. This assumption coincides with empirical
literature which have found that the law of one price does not seem to hold in the short-
run.15 It also allows us to account for real world frictions, such as the fact that sale
15See Rogoff (1996), Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Taylor and Taylor (2004) for an extensive review of
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contracts for commodities are generally written up with pre-specified prices, such that
changes in international commodity prices may take some time to filter through to the
price that the domestic firm receives. Taking the above into consideration, we select
the following functional specification, for the price of resources in the domestic currency:
Px,t =
(
stP
∗
x,t
) 1
2 (Px,t−1)
1
2 , where P ∗x,t is the price of commodities in the foreign currency.
Even though the pass-through of the foreign currency price is not immediate, it does occur
rather rapidly, with half of any change feeding through immediately and almost all of the
change within one year.
2.3.5 Import Sector
The import sector, indexed by f , consists of a continuum of domestic importers indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1], that import a homogeneous foreign intermediate product, for the foreign price
P ∗t . Each firm, via a one to one process, transforms the imported good into a differenti-
ated variety, Yf,it.
16 Each firm sells its variety in a domestic, monopolistically-competitive
market to produce the imported composite good, Yf,t, which is produced according to the
following CES production technology:
Yf,t =
(∫ 1
0
(Yf,it)
θf−1
θf di
) θf
θf−1
(2.20)
where θf controls the elasticity of substitution among the various import firms’ varieties.
Optimization yields the following demand function for each variety:
the Law of One Price and Purchasing Power Parity literature.
16We may conceptualise this as each firm just applying its brand name to the homogeneous import, so
as to create product differentiation.
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Yf,it =
(
Pf,it
Pf,t
)−θf
Yf,t (2.21)
where Pf,it is the price for firm i’s variety and Pf,t is the price of the composite imported
good.
Importing firms also face quadratic price adjustment costs, and thus choose prices to
optimise profits, which is given by:
Γf,it =
Pf,itYf,it
Pt
− MCf,itYf,it
Pt
− τf
2
[
Pf,it
Πηf,t−1Π1−ηPf,it−1
− 1
]2
Pf,tYf,t
Pt
(2.22)
where the importers’ nominal marginal cost, MCf,it, is given by:
MCf,it = εf,tstP
∗
t (2.23)
with εf,t representing a stationary mark-up shock.
2.3.6 Final Good Sector
The final good sector consist of a perfectly competitive representative firm who uses the
composite non-trade good, Yn,t, the composite domestic manufactured good, Y
d
m,t, and
the composite import good, Yf,t, to produce a final good, FGt, according to the CES
technology:
FGt =
[
ω
1
ν
n Y
ν−1
ν
n,t + ω
1
ν
mY
d
ν−1
ν
m,t + ω
1
ν
f Y
ν−1
ν
f,t
] ν
ν−1
(2.24)
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where ωn+ωm+ωf = 1 and ωn, ωm and ωf controls the share of non-tradable, manufactured
and imported goods respectively in the final good. ν is the elasticity of substitution among
those three inputs. Profit maximisation, along with the zero profit condition17, implies the
following functional form for the aggregate price index in the economy:
Pt =
[
ωnP
1−ν
n,t + ωmP
1−ν
m,t + ωfP
1−ν
f,t
]
(2.25)
2.3.7 Government
The government is assumed to raise revenues by imposing lump-sum taxes on households,
Tt, and by issuing domestic bonds, Bt. These revenues are used to finance government
expenditure, Gt, and to repay outstanding debt, Bt−1. Thus, the government budget
constraint is given by:
PtGt +Bt−1 = Tt +
Bt
Rt
(2.26)
Government spending is modelled as an exogenous process, which evolves according to:
ln
[
Gt
µt
]
= (1− ρg)ln(g) + ρgln
[
Gt−1
µt−1
]
+ εg (2.27)
where g is the steady state level of government spending, ρg a stationary autoregressive
coefficient and εg a normally distributed white noise term. Domestic debt is assumed to
be in zero net supply in equilibrium, such that Bt = 0 for all t.
17We can impose the zero profit condition, since the final good firm is perfectly competitive.
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2.3.8 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority is assumed to pursue a Taylor-type rule (see Taylor (1993) and
Taylor (1999)) in adjusting the nominal interest rate, Rt.
18 This rule is given by:
ln
(
Rt
R
)
= ρrln
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
%piln
(
Πt
Π
)
+ %yln
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ εr,t (2.28)
where Πt is the CPI inflation rate and Yt is the relevant measure of aggregate output in
the economy, (see equation 2.36). R, Π and Y are the steady-state values of Rt, Πt and
Yt, respectively. εr,t is a normally distributed white-noise error term, which is interpreted
as the monetary policy shock. The rule indicates that the central bank adjusts current
interest rates in response to past rates as well as in response to deviations of inflation from
target and output from its long-run equilibrium level.
2.3.9 Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market require that the following three conditions be satisfied:
Ym,t = Y
ex
m,t + Y
d
m,t (2.29)
Yx,t = Y
ex
x,t + Y
n
x,t + Y
m
x,t (2.30)
FGt = Ct + It +Gt (2.31)
18Taylor rules are simply monetary policy rules that delineate how a central bank should systematically
adjust its interest rate policy instrument in response to changes in inflation and other macroeconomic
variables.
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Equation 2.29 indicates that all output of the manufacturing sector must either be exported
or used domestically. Similarly, equation 2.30 indicates that output of the commodity sector
must either be exported abroad, or be used in the production process of the non-tradable
and manufacturing firms. Equation 2.31 outlines the uses of the domestic final good, which
must either be consumed, used for investment, where It = In,t + Im,t + Ix,t, or used for
government expenditure.
The trade balance or nominal net exports, NXt, is given by the sum of commodity
exports and manufacturing exports net of import values:
NXt = Px,tY
ex
x,t + stP
∗
m,tY
ex
m,t − stP ∗t Yf,t (2.32)
The current account equation, which governs the evolution of net foreign assets, B∗t , in
the economy is given by the sum of the previous net foreign asset position and the trade
balance:
stB
∗
t
κtR∗t
= stB
∗
t−1 +NXt (2.33)
Commodities are used as an input in the production processes of the the non-tradable
and manufacturing sectors. Consequently, value added in these sectors will be lower than
total production, and in order to calculate the relevant measure for aggregate output in the
economy, this needs to be taken into consideration. We do this by subtracting commodity
inputs and constructing a measure of value added output in these sectors as follows:
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Y van,t = Yn,t −
Px,t
Pn,t
Y nx,t (2.34)
Y vam,t = Ym,t −
Px,t
Pm,t
Y mx,t (2.35)
where Y van,t and Y
va
m,t are valued added output in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors,
respectively. The relevant measure for real GDP, Yt, is therefore obtained by summing the
value-added in each productive sector:
Yt =
[
Pn,t
Pt
]
Y van,t +
[
Pm,t
Pt
]
Y vam,t +
[
Px,t
Pt
]
Yx,t (2.36)
2.3.10 Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is modelled as a simple three equation system, consisting of an IS
curve, a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and a Taylor rule for the monetary au-
thority. The IS curve governs foreign output, the Phillips curve, foreign inflation and the
Taylor rule, foreign interest rate. These were originally modelled as exogenous AR(1) pro-
cesses, however this change allowed for more transparency and economic rationale in the
modelling of the foreign economy.
The equations are presented below in log-linearised form, where a hat over a variable
indicates log-deviation from its steady state value.
The foreign IS curve:
yˆ∗t = Etyˆ∗t+1 −
(
rˆ∗t − Etpˆi∗t+1
)− ξˆy∗,t (2.37)
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The foreign Phillips curve:
pˆi∗t = βEtpˆi∗t+1 + κ∗yˆ∗t + εpi∗,t (2.38)
The foreign Taylor rule:
rˆ∗t = ρr∗ rˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρr∗)
(
%pi∗pˆi
∗
t + %y∗ yˆ
∗
t
)
+ εr∗,t (2.39)
where y∗t is foreign output, r
∗
t is foreign interest rate, pi
∗
t is foreign inflation, ξy∗,t is a foreign
demand shock that follows a AR(1) process, κ∗ is a parameter which governs the slope of
the foreign NKPC, εpi∗,t is a white noise cost push shock and εr∗,t is a shock to foreign
monetary policy.
We also include in this section, the equation which governs the evolution of the foreign
price for commodities. In particular, we maintain the small open-economy assumption,
such that the price for commodities is entirely determined in world markets but is subject
to commodity-specific price shocks. Thus relative commodity prices in terms of the foreign
currency, evolves according to:
pˆ∗x,t = ρp∗x pˆ
∗
x,t−1 + εp∗x,t (2.40)
where p∗x,t =
P ∗x,t
P ∗t
is the relative price of commodities in the foreign currency, and pˆ∗x,t is the
log deviation of p∗x,t from its steady state value, p
∗
x. εp∗x,t is the commodity price shock and
ρp∗x , a stationary autoregressive coefficient.
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2.3.11 Exogenous Processes
The growth rate of the labour productivity process, ∆µt = ln(µt/µt−1) , is specified as
follows:
∆µt = ln(µ) + εµ,t (2.41)
where ln(µ) is the trend rate of growth and εµ,t is an uncorrelated and normally distributed
innovation, with zero mean and constant variance, σ2µ.
The structural shocks that evolve according to a first-order autoregressive process are
specified as follows:
ϕˆt = ρϕϕˆt−1 + εϕ,t εϕ,t ∼ N(0, σ2ϕ) (2.42)
for ϕ = {ξc, Ψ, Υ, An, Am, Ax, ξy∗}. The remaining shocks, εn, εdm, εexm , εf , εg, εr, εpi∗ , εr∗ and
εp∗x , are specified as serially uncorrelated and normally distributed white-noise processes.
2.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency to capture the prominent features of the
Canadian economy.19 Table 2.3 reports some relevant calibrated parameters. Steady state
productivity growth, µ, is set to 0.58 percent and inflation, to an annualised rate of 2.84
percent. These figures are consistent with the averages observed over the period 1981:Q1
to 2016:Q1, for which data was available.
19Some parameters of the model are assigned values prior to the calibration because they are non-
identified or the data used contain only limited information about them. The remaining parameters are
calibrated to capture the salient features of the Canadian economy.
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Table 2.3: Key Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Technology and Policy
µ Steady-state productivity growth rate 1.0058
pi Steady-state inflation rate 1.0071
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
κ Risk premium coefficient 0.001
b∗ Governs steady-state net foreign assets -0.008
g Governs steady-state government spending 0.772
Households
β Discount factor 0.9983
χ Intertemporal labour supply elasticity 1
ς Inter-sectoral labour supply elasticity 1
Final Goods Sector
ν Inter-sectoral elasticity of substitution in domestic final good 0.8
ωn Controls the share of non-tradables in final good production 0.59
ωm Controls the share of manufactured goods in final good production 0.10
ωf Controls the share of imports in final good production 0.31
Non-Tradable Sector
αn Labour’s share in production 0.66
γn Capital’s share in production 0.28
θn Elasticity of substitution in non-tradable sector 5
Manufacturing Sector
αm Labour’s share in production 0.63
γm Capital’s share in production 0.26
θm Elasticity of substitution in manufacturing sector 6
ν∗ Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 0.8
ω∗ Governs the share of manufactured goods that are exported 1.9
Commodity Sector
αx Labour’s share in production 0.39
γx Capital’s share in production 0.41
Imports Sector
θf Elasticity of substitution in imports sector 6
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The household’s discount factor, β, is parametrised to 0.9983, which along with the
previous two parameters imply a steady state real interest rate of about 6 percent. This is
close to the average value of 5.7 percent observed in the data.20 We calibrate both χ, which
is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity and ς, which governs the elasticity of
labour supply across sectors, to one. This is the generally accepted value in the literature,
(see Bouakez et al. (2009) and Justiniano and Preston (2010)) and allows labour across
sectors to be imperfect substitutes. Again, consistent with the literature, we set δ, the
capital depreciation rate, to 2.5 percent.
Based on the study of Macklem et al. (2000), we calibrate the shares of capital (γx),
labour (αx) and land (1−γx−αx) in the production function of the commodities sector to be
0.41, 0.39 and 0.2 respectively. Macklem et al. calculated these shares from the Canadian
1996 medium-level of aggregation input-output tables. The similar parameters for the non-
tradable and manufacturing sectors are also calibrated according to this study. For the
non-tradable sector capital (γn), labour (αn) and commodity input shares (1−γn−αn) are
0.28, 0.66, and 0.06, respectively. For the manufacturing sector, the associated input shares
are 0.26 for capital (γm), 0.63 for labour (αm) and 0.11 for commodity inputs (1−γm−αm).
The parameter, θl for l ∈ {n,m, f}, governing the elasticity of substitution within the
non-tradable, manufacturing and import sector is set equal to 6 for the manufacturing and
import sectors and 5 for the non-tradable sector. This implies an average price mark-up of
about 20 percent in the manufacturing and import sectors in steady state and 25 percent in
the non-tradable sector.21 The inter-sectoral elasticity of final demand, ν, and the elasticity
20Interest rates have since declined dramatically, particularly as a consequence of the global financial
crisis. However, we sought to match the average in the data, as this represented a much more stable period
and for steady-state analysis we generally do not want to focus on periods of significant volatility.
21Empirically, price mark-ups are generally found to be higher in the non-tradable sectors of the econ-
omy, since there is generally less direct competition between this sector of the domestic economy and the
rest of the world. Consequently, less substitutes are available and non-tradable firms are able to exert
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of demand for domestic manufactured goods in the foreign economy, ν∗, are also set equal
to 0.8. These values are consistent with the range of estimates in previous literature that
have examined small open economy models for Canada (see Ambler et al. (2004), Ortega
and Rebei (2006) and Dib (2011)).
The parameter ω∗ which controls the share of domestic manufactured goods that gets
exported is calibrated to 1.9 so that the ratio of manufactured exports to GDP in the
model, matches that in the data. The parameters ωn, ωm, and ωf that govern the share
of non-tradable, manufactured and imported goods in the production of the domestic final
good are set to 0.59, 0.10, and 0.31, respectively, to match the share of these sectors in
Canadian GDP. Finally, the parameters g and b∗ which govern the steady state level of
government spending and net foreign assets, respectively are set to match their relevant
counterparts in the data.22
2.4.1 Solution Process
The solution process for the system of equations involves (log) linearising the equilib-
rium conditions of the model around their deterministic steady state values using a first-
order Taylor-series approximation. These (log) linearised equations are then entered into
Dynare,23 and the program solves for the coefficients of the policy function, g. The policy
function is a set of equations that relate the current values of the variables to their past
values and to the current shocks. Thus we can trace how the endogenous variables in the
greater market power. The price mark-up is calculated as
(
θl
θl−1 − 1
)
× 100.
22g is set to match the government spending to GDP ratio and b∗ is set set to match the net-foreign
asset to GDP ratio.
23Dynare is a software platform for solving and performing policy exercises with a wide class of economic
models, in particular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE). It employs a collection of MATLAB
subroutines to accomplish these tasks.
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system would respond to exogenous shocks. Greater details of the solution process may be
found in Appendix B.2.
2.5 Model Results
We now use the model from the previous section to assess the impact of commodity price
shocks on the Canadian economy. In particular, we highlight the important asymmetric
sectoral effects that these shocks can have. Table 2.4 compares some relevant steady-state
ratios of the model to their averages in the data over the period 1981Q1 to 2016Q1.
Table 2.4: Steady-State Ratios of the Model
Ratio Data Average Model
Expenditure (per cent of GDP)
Household Consumption 52.1 51.3
Private Investment 16.8 24.8
Government Spending 24.8 23.9
Exports 27.7 21.7
Imports 25.2 21.7
Production∗ (per cent of GVA)
Non-Tradable 76.9 66.3
Manufacturing 12.9 19.1
Commodities 10.1 14.6
External Trade (per cent of exports)
Commodity Exports 43.8 43.1
Manufacturing Exports 56.2 56.9
Investment Demand (per cent of private investment)
Non-Tradable 49.1 59.7
Manufacturing 18.2 17.4
Commodities 32.7 22.9
Notes: ∗ The data averages for production span the period 1997Q1 to 2016Q1 due to availability.
The model was generally able to capture many of the key features of the data. In
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particular, the steady state behaviour of household consumption, government spending,
commodity and manufacturing exports were captured fairly well. The model however,
gives a higher result for the behaviour of private investment, while yielding somewhat
lower results for the production of non-tradables and investment demand for commodities.
2.5.1 Volatility and Correlations
To further assess the model we examine the standard deviations, σz, and autocorrelations,
E(zt, zt−1), implied by the model relative to similar statistics for the data over the period
1997Q1 to 2016Q1. These results are reported in Table 2.5 for some variables of interest.
Table 2.5: Moments of the Data and Model
Variable Symbol
Data Model
σz E(zt, zt−1) σz E(zt, zt−1)
Real Exchange Rate qt 4.63 0.76 4.73 0.82
Commodity Prices p∗x,t 14.03 0.76 14.63 0.77
Output Yt 1.19 0.89 2.43 0.81
Non-Tradable Value-Added Y van,t 0.79 0.89 3.08 0.80
Manufacturing Value-Added Y vam,t 3.37 0.87 2.86 0.86
Commodity Output Yx,t 2.97 0.77 6.95 0.93
Inflation pit 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.39
Interest Rate rt 0.48 0.88 0.30 0.85
Notes: The HP filter with λ = 1600 was applied to the data prior to calculation. This transforma-
tion, resulted in data series which were consistent with their model counterparts, thus allowing for
meaningful comparisons.
For several variables, the model is able to replicate the volatility. However, output in the
non-tradable and commodity producing sectors are the two notable exceptions, where the
model yields larger standard deviations for these variables relative to the data. The model
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also produces somewhat lower volatility for inflation and the interest rate relative to the
data, but captures it quite closely for the real exchange rate and commodity prices.
The autocorrelations of the model are generally in line with those found in the data.
The model does however produce greater persistence for commodity output and inflation
than the data. The autocorrelation of 0.77 generated for commodity prices in the model
is very close to the 0.76 observed in the data, highlighting the fact that the model is able
to accurately capture movements of commodity prices.
2.5.2 Impulse Responses
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the impulse responses to a positive 10 percent innovation in
commodity prices.This one-time shock represents an exogenous increase of commodity
prices in world markets.
Higher commodity prices result in a notable rise in aggregate output (relative to the
baseline in which commodity prices did not change). This is largely due to the rise in
domestic income stemming from the increase in commodity prices and greater commodity
production. Initially, there is also an increase in aggregate investment. By the second
quarter however, aggregate investment falls below baseline before returning to steady-
state and this largely reflects the decline in investment which occurs in the manufacturing
and non-tradable sectors, whereas the initial increase reflected higher investment in the
commodity producing sector.
Overall, consumption also increases in response to the shock, however, this is first
preceded by an initial decline. This short run decline in consumption is partly due to
the lower income(wages) in the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors and also to habit
persistence in the consumption patterns of households. However, this is quickly superseded
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate Responses to a Positive 10% Commodity Price Shock
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(after two quarters) by the rise in household wealth emanating from the commodity sector.
Similar results have been found in the consumption pattern of households in other models
for Canada. Murchison and Rennison (2006), for example found a sustained increase in
consumption (of about 0.4 percent for the first five years), which lasted for about twenty
years in response to a commodity price increase.
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Figure 2.2: Sectoral Responses to a Positive 10% Commodity Price Shock
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The real exchange rate appreciates on impact due to the rise in commodity prices be-
fore gradually returning to its steady state level. In spite of the appreciation, there is an
increase in commodity exports as commodity producing firms positively respond (that is,
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increase production in response) to exogenously higher commodity prices, which is denom-
inated in the foreign currency.24 Manufacturing exports, on the other hand, experience a
decline, as the higher exchange rate makes manufactured exports less competitive interna-
tionally. Even after four years, manufactured exports has not returned to its steady state
level. There is also a marginal increase in import volumes, highlighting the expenditure
switching effect of the currency appreciation, as the higher domestic demand is facilitated
by consuming more imports.
While output in the commodity producing sector increases in response to the shock,
the output of firms in the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors that use commodities
as an input, decline as the rise in commodity prices results in a shifting of resources across
sectors. Manufacturing output declines virtually on impact, while the decline in the non-
tradable sector occurs after the first quarter. This decline is less pronounced than that
observed for manufacturing and recovery occurs much sooner.25 As can be seen in panel F
of figure 2.2 there is a marked declined in demand for commodity inputs from both sectors.
These sectors also experience a decline in investment, whereas the opposite is true for the
commodity sector. The commodity sector, is relatively more productive and thus there is
a notable rise in the real wage in this sector relative to the marginal increases observed for
the other two sectors.
Inflation rises on impact, reflecting rising aggregate demand in the economy in response
to the higher commodity prices. These inflationary pressures are largely evident in the non-
tradable and manufacturing sectors as higher input costs, primarily for commodities, drive
up their relative prices.26 To combat the rising level of inflation, the monetary authority
24This is further reinforced by the fact that domestic demand for commodities, in the production of
manufactured and non-tradable goods decline.
25This is consistent with the results obtained in chapter one, utilising the VAR framework.
26Inflation in the import sector, actually declines reflecting the effect of the currency appreciation, which
causes imports to be cheaper.
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proceeds to increase the interest rate, which rises above its steady state level in order to
contain inflation.
2.5.3 Variance Decomposition
We now examine the unconditional variance decomposition of some relevant macroeco-
nomic variables to determine which shocks the model suggests are important for the de-
velopment of economic activity in Canada. These results are presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Unconditional Variance Decomposition
Variable
Shock
Productivity Demand Supply Commodity Monetary World
Output (Yt) 69.2 2.9 5.2 13.6 7.8 1.4
Consumption (Ct) 58.4 25.2 1.5 9.3 0.7 4.8
Investment (It) 85.3 1.2 4.0 1.1 6.4 2.0
Manuf. Exp. (Y exm,t) 2.9 0.1 77.0 6.3 0.0 13.8
Cmdty. Exp. (Y exx,t ) 29.6 1.0 2.0 54.1 1.7 11.7
Imports (Yf,t) 57.2 3.1 11.7 12.2 6.0 9.9
Inflation (pit) 17.9 0.3 68.0 4.2 1.0 8.6
Interest Rate (rt) 39.2 2.8 8.3 18.7 16.4 14.6
Cmdty. VA (Yz,t) 36.5 1.3 2.8 44.4 2.6 12.3
NonTrad. VA (Y van,t ) 77.5 3.7 5.2 2.7 7.9 2.9
Manuf. VA (Y vam,t) 41.7 0.7 42.5 7.3 1.5 6.4
Real FX Rate (qt) 3.1 0.4 1.0 17.7 1.2 76.5
Notes: Manuf. Exp.- Manufacturing Exports; Cmdty. Exp. - Commodity Exports; VA - Value-Added;
NonTrad. VA - Non-Tradable Value-Added
For ease of analysis and greater clarity, the shocks of the model have been grouped into
six broad categories. The first includes the ‘Productivity’ shocks: these are the labour-
augmenting technology shock (εµ), the investment shock (εΥ ), and the sector-specific tech-
nology shocks (ε
An
, ε
Am
, ε
Ax
). The ‘Demand’ category includes shocks to consumption
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preferences (ε
ξc
) and the government spending shock (εg). The ‘Supply’ group includes
the mark-up shocks in the non-tradable (εn), manufacturing (ε
d
m, ε
ex
m ) and import (εf )
sectors. Shocks to commodity prices (ε
p∗x
) are contained in the ‘Commodity’ group and
shocks to domestic interest rates (εr) in the ‘Monetary’ group. The final group consists of
the ‘World’ shocks which include the risk premium shock (ε
Ψ
) as well as shocks to foreign
output (ε
ξy∗
), inflation (εpi∗), and interest rates (εr∗).
The model indicates that much of the variation in economic activity in Canada can
be explained by the productivity shock. Approximately 69% of the variation in output
is explained by the productivity shock, with shocks to commodity prices contributing
approximately 14% to this variation. 58% of the volatility in consumption is also explained
by the productivity shock although a quarter of this volatility is also attributable to demand
shocks. Except for consumption, demand shocks do no appear to be a significant source
of volatility for Canadian macroeconomic variables.
Volatility of manufacture exports is largely due to supply shocks, with world shocks
contributing 14%, particularly the risk premium shock. Commodity price shocks are esti-
mated to explain over half the variance of commodity exports, with productivity and world
shocks jointly explaining an additional 41%. Supply shocks are found to be largely respon-
sible for the variation in inflation. This is primarily due to mark-up (cost-push) shocks in
the non-tradable sector.Productivity and world shocks explain an additional 18% and 9%,
respectively. However, the impact of monetary policy shock is relatively negligible.
Although the productivity shock on its own explains 39% of the variability in inter-
est rates, commodity shocks, monetary policy shocks and world shocks jointly explain
almost half of the variance of this variable. Variation in commodity output is primarily
due to commodity, productivity and world shocks, respectively. While variability in the
output of the non-tradable sector is largely due to productivity shocks, output variability
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in the manufacturing sector is approximately equally affected by productivity and supply
shocks. Variation in the real exchange rate is largely explained by world shocks, followed
by commodity price shocks.
Overall, the model indicates that much of the variation in economic activity is due
to productivity shocks, followed by commodity price shocks and then supply and world
shocks. Thus, the predictions of the model are in line with the empirical results from
chapter 1 and adds to the literature by providing further insights on the importance and
contribution of various shocks to Canadian output. In addition, a useful advantage of
employing a DSGE framework is the possibility of decomposing or disaggregating the
dynamics of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth, according to the different
structural shocks of the model. This exercise will give us further information on the
importance of the various shocks for driving economic dynamics and we carry out this
exercise in the next section.
2.5.4 Historical Decomposition of GDP Growth
As noted, we now turn to an examination of the structural shocks which the model indi-
cates were important in driving the Canadian business cycle over the period 1997Q1 to
2016Q1. We achieve this by computing the historical decomposition of Canada’s demeaned
GDP growth rate over this period. The historical decomposition essentially attributes all
deviations from steady-state in the variable under consideration to the structural shocks
of the model, so that we can assess the contribution of each shock to the evolution of the
variable.27
27To compute the historical decomposition, we used as observable variables real GDP, household fi-
nal consumption expenditure, business gross fixed capital formation, the sum of general government final
consumption expenditure and general government gross fixed capital formation ( i.e. government consump-
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The historical decomposition therefore allows us to visualize both the direction and
magnitude of contribution of each exogenous shock to the movement of the endogenous
variable. Additionally, unlike the variance decomposition, which tells us how each exoge-
nous shock contributes to the second moment (that is, the variance) of the endogenous
variables, the historical decomposition enables us to assess how each has contributed to
the first moment of the endogenous variables. The results of this exercise are presented in
Figure 2.3 below.28
As with the variance decomposition, the shocks have been grouped into the same six
broad categories to simplify the visual representation and improve clarity. According to
the results, over the entire period, productivity shocks have played an important role in
explaining GDP growth. This shock contributed positivity to growth both in the early and
latter parts of the sample, but its contribution during the mid-period (2000Q2 to 2009Q2
and 2011Q1 to 2014Q1) has generally been negative. This was particularly evident during
the period of the global financial crisis, when at its height, large negative productivity
shocks deducted almost 3 percentage points off of GDP growth.
Supply shocks have also been a significant contributor to GDP growth over the period.
While its influence was relatively muted in the early parts of the sample, post-1999Q1
its impact has grown consistently. In fact, during the period 2004Q1 to 2007Q1, positive
supply shocks counteracted the effect of a series of negative productivity shocks, which
tion), commodity exports, manufacturing exports, Gross Value-Added in the non-tradable, manufacturing
and commodity producing sectors, CPI inflation, services inflation as a proxy for inflation in the non-
tradable sector, the overnight rate, the nominal exchange rate, the BoC commodity price index, US real
GDP, CPI inflation and the federal funds rate. All variables are measured as quarterly growth rates, with
the exception of inflation and interest rates, which are measured as quarterly averages in levels. Finally,
the variables are demeaned using their sample averages.
28In the graph, the actual data is represented by the solid line while the contribution of each shock to
the historical movement of (demeaned) GDP growth is shown in the form of a stacked bar chart. Thus,
the contributions indicated by each bar sums to the value given by the solid line in each period.
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Figure 2.3: Historical Decomposition of GDP Growth
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otherwise would have resulted in below average GDP growth for that period. Its positive
contribution during the period of the GFC also helped to mitigate the impact of that
event, however, in the period immediately following the crisis, the contribution of this
shock turned negative as the economy started to recover.
According to the model, commodity price shocks played just as large a role as supply
shocks in accounting for the movements in GDP growth, thus implying that this shock is
particularly important in the Canadian context. It contributed to above average growth in
the period 1999Q2 to 2000Q2 and along with supply shocks, helped to offset the negative
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productivity shocks during the period 2004Q1 to 2005Q4. As with productivity shocks, the
commodity price shock contributed significantly to the decline in growth which occurred
during the GFC. In fact, close to the trough of the recession, this shock detracted 2.3
percentage points from GDP growth. During the recovery phase immediately following
the crisis however, commodity price shocks have generally been positive. In contrast,
towards the end of the sample (2014Q3 onwards) the contribution of this shock has been
negative, likely reflecting the decline in energy prices which has been counteracting the
pace of economic recovery in Canada.
The role played by the remaining shocks in the model, are not as significant as the
three discussed. The monetary policy shock, for example, has generally been contrac-
tionary over the period, with the most notable exception being at the start of the crisis
and in its immediate aftermath where this shock contributed positively to GDP growth.
Overall, the results of the historical decomposition are in-line with those obtained from
the variance decomposition, in terms of the relative importance of the various shocks in
driving Canadian economic activity. The results indicate that economic activity is largely
driven by productivity, commodity price and supply shocks. Given these findings, we now
examine some possible implications of the model, using it as a tool to carry out some policy
counterfactuals.
2.5.5 Counterfactual Policy Exercises
We now employ the model to assess interesting counterfactual policy questions, which shed
light on the possible implication of alternative policy actions in response to external shocks
which have affected the Canadian economy. With the onset of the global financial crisis,
and the ensuing economic downturn in many countries, policy-makers undertook various
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actions with the goal of mitigating the effect on this crisis on their domestic economy. The
Canadian experience was no different. Canadian policy-makers however did not express
significant concerns about the crisis until after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008.29 This was evident from the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) 3rd September 2008 press
release, where they noted that eventhough domestic demand in Canada had slowed, it had
remained strong and decided to keep the target for the overnight rate fixed at 3 percent.
Following the collapse however, the Bank undertook several rounds of aggressively reduc-
ing interest rates, so as to stimulate consumer demand and promote economic activity.30
These actions could lead one to ask the questions of what would have happened had the
Central Bank not reduced interest rates when it did, or alternatively what if the BoC
had started to aggressively reduce rates sooner, prior to the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers and the intensification of the crisis which was accompanied by precipitously declining
commodity prices?
In this section, we attempt to answer these questions with the design of two policy
experiments. The first of these examine the impact on some relevant macro-variables of
the Central Bank not lowering interest rates when it did, but rather keeping it fixed at
its relatively high level of 3 percent as at September 2008 for an additional two quarters.
In the second experiment we analyse what would have been the economic consequences if
the Central Bank had begun to aggressively cut interest rates sooner. These simulation
experiments are labelled scenarios 1 and 2 respectively, in the discussion which follows.
In scenario 1, we examine how the economy would have behaved in the aftermath of the
29Lehman Brothers was a global financial intermediary and the insolvency of this firm is recognised
by many as the key event which triggered the intensification of significant upheavals in global financial
markets.
30This was particularly important in the Canadian context, as commodity prices, which had undergone
an extended period of growth was beginning to decline rather quickly over a relatively short period of
time. This reflected the deterioration of economic activity in U.S., Japan and Europe and resulted in an
uncertain outlook for Canada’s economic future.
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GFC and declining commodity prices if the Central Bank had not intervened by lowering
rates. Thus we are able to assess how the economy would have evolved in the context of
lower commodity prices, but with relatively higher interest rates, than that which actually
prevailed. To eliminate the effects of the easing of monetary policy31 in response to the
crisis and falling commodity prices, we keep the interest rate constant at its relatively high
level of 3 per cent as at September 2008 for the quarters of September 2008 through to
March 2009. Thus, in Scenario 1 we feed all the generated shocks into the system but
hold the interest rate constant from September 2008 to March 2009. In order to obtain
the constant interest rate, this required a change in the path of the monetary policy shock
while keeping the other shocks at their original values. Essentially, a sequence of precisely
determined negative monetary policy shocks were feed into the system, such that equation
2.28 endogenously gave rise to a fixed interest rate for the period September 2008 to March
2009. The results of scenario 1 are presented in Figure 2.4 which shows the time path of
relevant macro variables from this experiment.
Note that in Figure 2.4 the baseline and scenario paths coincide until the September
2008 quarter, when we start to hold interest rates constant. Interest rate is held constant at
3 percent from September 2008 to March 2009, and then allowed to evolve endogenously
thereafter, where it declined to 1.7 percent in the June 2009 quarter. In the data (the
black dotted line in panel H of Figure 2.4), the interest rate was gradually reduced from
3.0 percent to 0.25 percent over the same period, resulting from the monetary easing actions
of the Central Bank.
Under Scenario 1, without this policy intervention, the simulated time path of aggregate
output and aggregate output growth differ significantly from their data path in the post-
31The BoC reduced the overnight target rate from 3 per cent to 0.5 per cent over the period September
2008 to March 2009.
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Figure 2.4: Time-Path of Variables Under a Fixed Interest Rate - Scenario 1
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Notes: Baseline represents the time path of the variables had interest rates not been held constant for the
Sept. 2008, Dec. 2008 and Mar. 2009 quarters. Aggregate GDP growth is reported as quarter-over-quarter
percentage change, interest rates as the quarterly average of the daily values and all other variables as
percentage deviations from steady-state.
crisis period. Without the policy intervention, aggregate output would have fallen below its
steady state level beginning in the March 2009 quarter and remained so until the September
2010 quarter. In contrast, the baseline path, which accounts for the monetary intervention
of the BoC, would have only been lower than steady state for two quarters (June 2009 and
September 2009).
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These marked differences are also reflected in the rate of aggregate output growth (see
panel B). Output growth declined to 2.9 percent and 4.0 percent in the December 2008 and
March 2009 quarters, when interest rates are held constant, as opposed to declines of only
1.8 percent and 2.9 percent in the data. Thus we can see that without the intervention
of the Central Bank, the recession would have been much more severe in the aftermath of
the crisis. Recovery however, was stronger under scenario 1, than that which was actually
observed in the data. Thus it seems there may be some trade-off between the severity
of the recession versus the strength of the recovery, which may necessitate a choice as to
which path is preferable - a more severe recession with a stronger recovery or a less severe
recession with a more muted and protracted recovery.
Similar to aggregate output, we also see notable differences in the time paths of invest-
ment and consumption under scenario 1 versus the baseline. Consumption remained con-
sistently below the baseline value, reflecting the negative impact of the GFC on consumer
confidence and hence offers some justification for the Central Bank seeking to support con-
sumer demand, by lowering rates. At its through, investment was 23.8 percent lower than
its steady state value when interest rates are held at 3 percent versus a decline of only 11.7
percent in the baseline. The higher interest rate, combined with weak consumer demand
and declining aggregate output, contributed greatly to this precipitous decline in invest-
ment. As with aggregate output, the recovery in investment was stronger under scenario
1. Which also confirms that there is a trade-off present in the policy choices available to
the monetary authorities.
With respect to sectoral output, we see a similar pattern. Output in all three sectors is
lower in scenario 1 than in the baseline. This is most notable for the non-tradable sector,
which constitutes the largest sector of the economy. The impact on the manufacturing
sector is less noticeable, while the higher rates lead to a moderate, but protracted decline
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in the commodity producing sector.
In scenario 2, we examine the likely macroeconomic conditions that would have pre-
vailed had the Central Bank aggressively began lowering rates sooner, that is, prior to
September 2008. The design of this policy experiment necessitated identifying a sequence
of three monetary policy shocks in equation 2.28 for the quarters March 2008 to September
2008, such that the endogenous path for interest rates followed a predefined counterfactual
trajectory, while the remaining shocks in the model assumed their previously computed
values. The predefined trajectory for interest rates which we sought to match was the
reduction in interest rates which occurred over the period December 2008 to June 2009.32
This experiment is particularly useful as it allows us to assess whether the impact of the
recession and falling commodity prices would have been milder had the Central Bank pur-
sued a policy of expansionary monetary policy sooner. The results of this experiment are
displayed in Figure 2.5.
As can be seen from Figure 2.5 interest rates declined much earlier under scenario 2
than in the baseline case, from 3.4 percent to 1.7 percent over the quarters March 2008 to
September 2008 versus a much more muted decline of 3.8 percent to 3.0 percent over the
same period in the data.
The earlier decline in interest rates lead to higher growth in aggregate output over the
period, however, the effect of the crisis on output growth was still significant, and in fact,
aggregate output growth post-crisis was lower than the baseline case. Despite this, the
level of aggregate output would have been distinctly higher had the course of policy action
examined in scenario 2 been undertaken by the monetary authority.
The lower interest rate also positively impacted investment and consumer demand.
32We essentially brought these interest rate reductions forward by three periods, and then allowed rates
to evolve endogenously thereafter.
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Figure 2.5: Time-Path of Variables when Interest Rates are Lowered Earlier -
Scenario 2
2007 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 Q3 2010 Q3 2011 Q3 2012 Q3 2013 Q3 2014 Q3 2015 Q3
−10
−5
0
5
10
G. Output − Commodity Sector (%)
−10
−5
0
5
E. Output − Manufacturing Sector (%)
0
2
4
6
C. Output − NonTradable Sector (%)
−4
−2
0
2
4
A. Aggregate Output (%)
 
 
Baseline
R reduced from Mar 08−Sept 08
2007 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 Q3 2010 Q3 2011 Q3 2012 Q3 2013 Q3 2014 Q3 2015 Q3
0
1
2
3
4
5
H. Interest Rate (%)
3
4
5
6
F. Consumption (%)
−10
−5
0
5
10
D. Investment (%)
−2
−1
0
B. Aggregate Output Growth (%)
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in the Mar. 2008, June 2008 and Sept 2008 quarters. Aggregate GDP growth is reported as quarter-over-
quarter percentage change, interest rates as the quarterly average of the daily values and all other variables
as percentage deviations from steady-state.
Whereas output was 11.7 percent below trend in the June 2009 quarter in the absence of
the policy experiment, it was only 5 percent below trend in the case of scenario 2. The
impact on consumption, though moderate, was persistent, as consumption remained above
the baseline case for a significant period.
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Sectoral output was also higher under scenario 2, relative to the baseline. Output in
the non-tradable sector was particularly higher in the earlier periods of the sample, though
it went marginally below baseline in the post-June 2010 period. For the commodity sector,
the impact was largely felt in the longer horizons, as opposed to the shorter horizons.
The differential time response of these two sectors likely reflect their differing underlying
structures. This is so, as projects which take advantage of the lower interest rates in the
commodity-producing sector (agriculture, mining, oil extraction etc.) are expected to see
increased production only after a significant lag, whereas the impact of lower interest rates
on output in the non-tradable sector (made up largely of services industries) is expected
to be more immediate. The impact on the manufacturing sector was relatively muted,
although it too was marginally higher.
Thus, it appears that pursuing a policy of reducing interest rates sooner would have
had an overall beneficial effect on the economy. We do note however, that the results
obtained here should be viewed as a lower bound on the possible effect of policy actions
on the economy since the Central Bank, not only engaged in monetary easing by lowering
the interest rate (which is the only policy action examined here), but also employed non-
conventional monetary policy, such as quantitative easing (where funds were made directly
available to the financial sector). Incorporating quantitative easing, we would expect to
see an even larger effect of policy action on the economy.
2.6 Policy Implications
From a policy perspective, our results from this and the previous chapter, support the view
that decision makers should take commodity price movements into account and in partic-
ular how these movements impact each sector of the economy. While positive commodity
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price shocks may be beneficial to commodity producing sectors of the economy, these same
shocks are likely to negatively impact Canada’s manufacturing and non-tradable sectors.
Consequently, policy makers should consider implementing programmes which offset these
possible negative effects by channelling some of the windfall from the commodity producing
sectors into those sectors which are negatively impacted by rising commodity prices.
These actions may include policies such as taxing the consumption of luxury goods and
services which are fuelled by higher personal incomes from employment in the commodity
producing sector,33 (also by collecting royalties and taxes from the commodity producing
firms themselves) and using those additional revenues to create a stabilisation fund which
may be accessed for capital investment projects by firms in the manufacturing and non-
tradable sectors (or be used for other projects and activities which boost productivity and
competitiveness in these sectors). This same fund, may also be useful to support activities
in the commodity producing sector itself when it is faced with a significant negative shock
which results in drastically declining prices and output, such at that which materialised
during the GFC.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have sought to examine the impact of commodity price shocks on a small
commodity exporting open economy, using Canada as the stylized example. This is directly
related to what we attempted to achieve in chapter 1, however, here we employ a different
methodological framework, more specifically, a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
model. This extended framework allows us to examine linkages in the economy that were
33Our model showed a significant rise in consumption, in response to the positive commodity price
shock.
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not possible with the method employed in the previous chapter and thus represents an
extension of the work undertaken there. Additionally, the DSGE model allowed us to
conduct scenario analysis, so that we could examine the possible economic impact of certain
counterfactual policy actions in response to the large negative commodity price shock which
accompanied the global financial crisis.
The model employed was that developed by Dib (2008), with some minor modifica-
tions. Dib’s focus, in his paper, was specifically on how commodity price shocks affected
the exchange rate and the associated welfare effects. He did not exploit the sectoral nature
of the model to assess how each sector responded to relevant shocks, such as shocks to
commodity prices. In this way, the focus of our paper is different from Dib, and reflects
our contribution to the literature in an area which has been relatively unaddressed. Addi-
tionally, using the model to examine the policy response to a real-world commodity price
shock, represents a unique contribution of our paper. While the policy response to the
GFC in the Canadian context has been examined it many ways (see BIS (2008), Zorn et
al. (2009)), this paper is the first to assess the policy response within a DSGE framework
and examine how this action influenced the sectoral outcome for Canada.
The model was generally able to capture key features of the data and showed that the
Canadian economy was highly responsive to changes in the prices of commodity exports.
The evolution and volatility of aggregate GDP growth in particular, was significantly in-
fluenced by changes in commodity prices, as illustrated by its behaviour during the GFC.
These results suggest that commodity price shocks, along with productivity and supply
shocks, have been important in driving the Canadian business cycle.
The disaggregated nature of the model also allowed us to analyse the differing sectoral
responses in the economy. We found that although a positive commodity price shock,
resulted in an unambiguous increase in aggregate output, this largely reflected increased
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output in the commodity producing sectors, as output in both the manufacturing and
non-tradable sectors declined. Similar diverging responses were noted with respect to sec-
toral investment. Thus the disaggregated nature of the model is of particular importance in
analysing and understanding the transmission mechanism of such external shocks through-
out the economy, as otherwise, important sectoral differences may be overlooked when only
an aggregated model is examined.
With respect to policy actions undertaken in response to significant negative commod-
ity price shocks, we can conclude from our counterfactual policy exercises that the actions
taken by the monetary authority may necessarily involve some trade-off between attenu-
ating the severity of a recession versus heightening the strength of recovery. The action of
the Central Bank during the GFC, also appeared to have positively impacted the economic
outcome for Canada, while at the same time, earlier actions by the Bank may have proved
to be even more beneficial.
Despite what has been accomplished with the model thus far, there exists room for im-
provement and these remain areas for further extension and future research. In particular,
the current model was calibrated based on available data, however, it would be useful and
informative to estimate some parameters of the model to extract even more information
from the available data in a consistent and transparent manner. Additionally, the GFC
has shown that financial linkages within the economy may be important in assessing how
the economy responds to certain shocks. Incorporating such linkages and a well specified
financial sector is thus an important area for future research.
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and the Stock
Market in Canada and the U.S.
3.1 Introduction
Among asset prices, stock prices are typically the most closely monitored by the general
public and decision makers. Changes in asset prices affect the economy through various
channels. In particular, fluctuations in stock prices have a direct impact on the balance-
sheet, wealth, collateral value and liquidity of households and firms. Moreover, since stock
prices can be volatile and at times can deviate from fundamental values for prolonged
periods, abrupt changes in their prices can have disastrous implications for the economy
(Bordo and Jeanne 2002). On the other hand, changes in the policy instrument of central
banks and short-term rates have a direct and immediate effect on stock prices. Since stock
prices play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy and monetary policy in
turn can have an important impact on stock prices, it is critically important to understand
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how precisely they are interconnected.
Many papers have studied how monetary policy and stock prices are connected in
the U.S (for example, Neri (2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Gilchrist et al. (2009),
Nistico´ (2012)) using either a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) or a small-scale
DSGE model. Studies using Canadian data are not as prevalent. To identify monetary
policy and stock price shocks, most papers that employ a SVAR usually assume a recursive
or short-run identification where a particular causal relationship between stock prices and
monetary policy is imposed. These papers either assume that monetary policy respond
with a lag to a shock in stock prices or the reverse.
There are two reasons why this type of identification is problematic. First, as we show
in the paper, assuming a recursive identification can lead to the wrong and counterfactual
response for stock prices, interest rates and other variables following a monetary policy
shock. For example, if we assume that stock prices react with a lag to a monetary policy
shock, a positive monetary policy shock leads to an increase in stock prices in Canada.
Second, there is ample empirical evidence that monetary policy and stock prices react to
each other simultaneously and without any delay. Rigobon and Sack (2004) for example
find that the probability of a 25 basis point (b.p.) tightening at the next FOMC meeting
immediately increases to just over 50 per cent if there is an unexpected 5 per cent increase
in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that a 25 basis
point unexpected easing in the Federal funds rate instantly leads to a 1.25 per cent increase
in the stock market, that is a stock market multiplier of 5. Coincidentally, this is by about
the same magnitude that the S&P/TSX index rose when on January 21, 2015, the Bank
of Canada surprised markets by decreasing the overnight rate by 0.25 per cent.1
1Data from BAX futures or the 1-month Treasury bill indicated that market participants were not
pricing in any reduction in interest rates.
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The literature has attempted to resolve this simultaneity and identification problem
in two ways. First, as in Rigobon and Sack (2004), high frequency data are employed to
formally test whether there is no feedback from interest rates to stock prices. The idea
here is to measure the responsiveness of stock prices to monetary policy shocks that are
identified based on changes in variance of the policy rate on days of FOMC announcements.
However, if one wants to also study the reaction of other variables that are only available
on a lower frequency basis, this approach would be difficult to implement. The second
approach is to use lower frequency data and solve the simultaneity problem in a different
way. Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) in their paper overcome this simultaneity problem by
assuming that monetary policy shocks have no long-run impact on real stock prices. The
additional zero restriction gained by assuming this long-run constraint removes the need to
impose a zero coefficient between stock prices and monetary policy in the short-run impact
matrix. By doing so, they have an exactly identified SVAR while allowing stock prices and
monetary policy to react to each other’s shocks contemporaneously.
The identifying restrictions used by Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) are thus very ap-
pealing and are a big improvement on the previous literature as the simultaneity problem
is solved while at the same time, the SVAR is exactly identified. However, to achieve iden-
tification, they nevertheless have to impose fairly rigid and possibly ad-hoc assumptions
on the causal relationship between the other variables in the model instead of letting the
data reveal these causal relationships. As a result, their findings may not be robust to
different recursive orderings.
In this paper, we start with the same premise as in Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) by
allowing interest rates and stock prices to react contemporaneously to each other’s shock
but the novelty here is our agnostic view regarding the identification of all the shocks in
the model and about the short-run and long-run relationship among all the variables. We
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employ a six-variable VAR and then impose a minimal set of identifying restrictions that
are used in the literature on some equations while leaving the other equations unrestricted.
First, in the baseline model, we do not impose any short-run restrictions on the model.
We allow all variables to react contemporaneously to each other, including stock prices
and interest rates.2 Second, we assume that monetary policy and demand shocks are
neutral in the long-run, a common assumption in the VAR literature.3 Since our SVAR
remains underidentified, we use sign restrictions to identify all the impulse responses that
are consistent with the reduced form VAR. We derive our sign restrictions from a small
scale DSGE model which include stock prices, monetary policy and confidence shocks. We
believe that our approach is more flexible as it solves the simultaneity problem while at
the same time, it does not rely on a number of short-run identifying assumptions that
may be ad-hoc or not entirely consistent with the data. The methodology that we use to
combine short-run, long-run and sign restrictions in the underidentified SVAR is adapted
from Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) and Binning (2013).
Our results suggest that employing recursive identification in monetary VARs of this
type can lead to counterfactual responses for the stock market following a monetary policy
shock and for the interest rate following a stock market shock. They therefore highlight the
dangers of using this particular identification strategy to study the relationship between
stock prices and monetary policy and this is another contribution of our paper. Using
Canadian data, we find that a positive monetary policy shock leads to an increase in
stock prices, if we assume that stock prices react with a lag to monetary policy shocks.
In contrast, if we assume that stock prices react immediately to monetary policy shocks,
2We also impose as a robustness test the usual assumption that monetary policy has no contempora-
neous impact on output and inflation, a common assumption in the monetary policy literature.
3Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) assume that monetary policy has no impact in the long-run on real
stock prices.
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we obtain the expected response, however the response of interest rates to a stock market
shock is contrary to expectations. Moreover, employing a recursive identification also leads
to counterfactual responses for some macro variables following a monetary policy shock.
Industrial production and inflation both increase following an increase in interest rates in
the Canadian and U.S. VAR.
When we employ the underidentified VAR, we do not obtain any counterfactual re-
sponses and we find that the stock market and monetary policy have an important impact
on each other in Canada and in the U.S. We find that an increase of 25 b.p in the policy
rate of the central bank leads to a fall of about 1.75% in stock prices in Canada and to
a fall of about 1.25% in stock prices in the U.S. The stock market, industrial production,
inflation and commodity prices react negatively to a positive monetary policy shock in
Canada and the U.S. Our estimates for the U.S are in line with the empirical literature.
Estimates in the empirical literature range from 0.5 to 2.5 per cent for the U.S. Our esti-
mates for Canada are larger compared to the few papers that estimate this relationship.
We argue that the effect of the monetary policy shock in Canada is larger compared to the
U.S. mainly because the sectors that are interest rate sensitive such as materials, finan-
cials, industrials and energy account for a much larger share of the stock index in Canada
compared to the U.S. These sectors account for around 75% of the TSX index and only
33% of the S&P 500 index. On the other hand, sectors that are less sensitive to interest
rate changes such as telecoms, utilities, health care and consumer staples account for a
much larger share of the U.S. stock market (28%) compared to the Canadian stock market
(13%).
Following a positive stock market shock, the short-term interest rate, industrial pro-
duction, inflation and commodity prices rise both in Canada and in the U.S. In Canada,
a 1% increase in the stock market leads to an increase of about 27 basis points in the
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overnight rate, while it leads to an increase of about 10 basis points in the Federal funds
rate. Our estimates for the U.S. are in line with the empirical literature. Typical estimates
range from 2 to 12 basis points for the U.S.
3.2 Literature Review
The literature studying the interaction between stock market and monetary policy can be
divided into two types of approaches: SVAR and other types including event-studies and
DSGE models. Most of the studies have used U.S. data and there is little work for Canada.
Most VAR studies including those by Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997) and Neri (2004)
analyse the effect of monetary policy on stock prices using a recursive VAR and assume
that either stock prices react to monetary policy shocks with a lag or the reverse. Single-
equation studies such as that by Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006) also follow in the same
vein. All of these studies find that an increase in the short-term interest rate decreases
stock prices, at least in the short-run. Neri (2004) for example, finds that a 1 per cent
increase in the short-term interest rate leads to a 3.6 per cent decrease in stock prices in the
U.S. after four months. Li et al. (2010) analyse the impact of monetary policy shocks on
stock prices in Canada and the U.S. using short-run restrictions. They use a non-recursive
system and impose many strong assumptions to exactly identify their SVAR. They find
that the response of stock prices in Canada to an unanticipated monetary policy shock is
much smaller than in the U.S. A 25 basis point change in the policy rate leads to a 0.8 per
cent change in stock prices in Canada and to a 4 per cent change in stock prices in the
U.S. This peak response is achieved after four months in Canada and after 17 months in
the U.S. They argue that these differences are caused mostly by differences in the degree
of openness of the asset markets in Canada and the U.S. They do not study how changes
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in stock prices affect the policy rate of the central bank.
Other studies such as Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) and Rigobon and Sack (2003;
2004) assume a non-recursive structure and allow stock prices and monetary policy to
react to each other’s shock contemporaneously. Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) find great
interdependence between the federal funds rate and real stock prices in the U.S. They
show that a 25 basis points increase in the federal funds rate, decreases real stock prices
by 1.25 to 1.75 per cent. On the other hand, a one per cent increase in stock prices
lead to an increase in the federal funds rate by around 4 basis points. Rigobon and Sack
(2004) use a simultaneous identification approach and high frequency data to formally
test whether there is no feedback from interest rates to stock prices. Their strategy relies
on identifying changes in the variance of the short-term rates on FOMC and Humphrey-
Hawkins testimony meetings and examining the response of several stock price indices on
these days. They find that a 25 basis points increase in the short-term interest rate leads
to a fall of 2.4% in the Nasdaq index and to a fall of 1.7% in the S&P 500 index.
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use an event-study approach to analyse the effects of
unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate on stock prices. They use data from the
futures market to estimate the expected value of the federal funds rate and then compare
this expected value with the actual decision of the Federal Reserve. By doing so, they get a
measure of the unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate target. They find that there
is a five-fold increase in stock prices following an unanticipated cut in the federal funds
rate target. Gurkaynak et al. (2005) also use an event-study approach similar to Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) and find that unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate target
lead to approximately a five-fold change in stock prices. They also study the impact on
stock prices from unanticipated changes in the future path of the federal funds rate arising
from changes in the statement that accompanies FOMC announcements. They find that
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stock prices are also severely impacted by these revisions in expectations.
Studies by Castelnuovo and Nistico` (2010), Airaudo et al. (2007), and Challe and
Giannitsarou (2014) use small-scale DSGE models to examine the effects of policy shocks
on stock prices. These papers also find that an increase in the policy rate of the central
bank leads to a decrease in stock prices. The estimates from the DSGE models are in line
with the empirical literature as they find that a 25 basis points change in the policy rate
typically leads to a 1% change in stock prices. Table 3.1 summarizes some of the literature
which examines the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices.
Table 3.1: Literature Survey - Stock Prices and Monetary Policy
Author(s) Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
VAR Studies
Patelis
(1997)
excess stock returns,
federal funds rate, various
measures of interest rate
spread,nonborrowed
reserves, total reserves,
dividend yield, T-bill
rates
1962M3 - 1994M11 VAR with
short-run
identification
A contractionary mone-
tary policy shock is gener-
ally associated with lower
expected stock returns ini-
tially, and higher returns
in the longer-term.
Rapach
(2001)
implicit GDP deflator
(price level variable),
3-month T-bill rate, real
GDP, S&P 500 stock
price index
1959Q3 - 1999Q1 VAR identified
with only long-run
restrictions
A 1% positive interest rate
shock, leads to an approx-
imate 6% decline in stock
prices. A similar 1% pos-
itive stock prices shock,
leads to a 0.05 percentage
point rise in interest rates.
Neri
(2004)
world commodity price
index, nominal exchange
rate, industrial
production, CPI,
short-term interest rate,
monetary aggregate,
stock market index
1985M1 - 2000M12 VAR identified
with short-run
non-recursive
restrictions
A 1% exogenous increase
in short-term interest
rates, result in a 4%
(1%) decline in stock
market indices for the
U.S. (Canada).
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Table 3.1: Literature Survey - Stock Prices and Monetary Policy Cont’d
Author(s) Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Bjørnland
and Leitemo
(2009)
CPI, commodity price
index, industrial
production, federal funds
rate, S&P 500 stock price
index
1983M1 - 2002M12 VAR with
short-run and
long-run
identification
A 1% increase in the
federal funds rate (stock
prices) leads to a 9%
decline (0.04 percentage
point increase) in real
stock prices (interest
rates).
Li et al.
(2010)
industrial production
index, consumer price
index, S&P 500 index,
TSE 300 index,
CAD/USD exchange rate,
O/N interest rate, Fed
funds rate, M2, oil prices
1988M1 - 2003M12 VAR identified
with short-run
non-recursive
restrictions
On impact, an unantici-
pated 25 bp increase in the
federal funds rate resulted
in a 0.55% decline in stock
prices. A similar increase
in the Canadian overnight
rate lead to a negligible
0.003% decrease in Cana-
dian stock prices.
Other Methodologies
Thorbecke
(1997)
industrial production,
inflation rate, a
commodity price index,
federal funds rate,
non-borrowed reserves,
total reserves, stock
returns (CRSP database)
1967M1-1990M12 Multiple methods:
VAR (short-run
recursive
identification),
GMM,
Event-study
a one standard deviation
increase in the fed funds
rate, on impact, leads to
a 0.8% decline in stock
prices.
Rigobon and
Sack
(2003)
3 month T-bill rate, S&P
500 stock price index
Mar1985 - Dec1999
(daily data)
Heteroskedasticity-
based
approach
A 5 percent rise (fall) in
the S&P 500 index in-
creases the probability of
a 25 b.p. tightening (eas-
ing) of the interest rate by
about a half.
Rigobon and
Sack
(2004)
Dow Jones Industrial
Average, S&P 500,
Nasdaq, Wilshire 5000,
Treasury yields,
eurodollar futures rates
January 3, 1994 -
November 26, 2001
(daily data with
78 policy dates
included)
Heteroskedasticity-
based
approach
an unanticipated 25 b.p.
increase in short-term in-
terest rate leads to a 1.7%
fall in the S&P 500 index
and a 2.4% fall in the Nas-
daq index.
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Table 3.1: Literature Survey - Stock Prices and Monetary Policy Cont’d
Author(s) Data Sample Period Methodology Main Findings
Bernanke
and Kuttner
(2005)
federal funds rate, the
Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP)
value-weighted index
Jun 1989 - Dec 2002
(131 “events” in to-
tal)
Event-study A hypothetical unex-
pected 25 basis-point
reduction in the Federal
funds rate target is, on
average, associated with
an approximate 1% rise in
broad stock indices.
Ioannidis
and
Kontonikas
(2006)
nominal stock return,
short-term interest rate
1972M1 - 2002M7 single equation
estimation (OLS)
stock returns are signifi-
cantly affected by changes
in monetary policy.
Airaudo et al
(2007)
not applicable - calibrated DSGE The optimal interest rate
rule for the policy-maker
is one which responds to
a stock price index.
Castelnuovo
and
Nistico`
(2010)
real per capita GDP, real
per capita consumption,
real S&P 500 index, real
wages, per capita hours
worked, inflation, fed
funds rate
1954Q3 - 2007Q2 estimated DSGE A 25 bp unexpected rise
in the federal funds rate
causes stock-prices to de-
cline by about 20 bp. In
contrast, a 1% shock to
stock-prices results in a 12
bp interest rate hike on-
impact.
Challe and
Giannitsarou
(2014)
not applicable - calibrated DSGE The model predicts that a
positive shock to the pol-
icy rate causes a decline
in stock prices on impact,
and this is in-line with em-
pirical estimates.
3.3 Exact and Partial Identification
As discussed in Kilian (2013), in the VAR literature, there are a number of potential
sources for identifying structural shocks from the reduced-from VAR. Economic theory is
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often used to identify structural shocks and theory can inform us about the long-run and
short-run responses of some variables to shocks. For example, firms may not change their
investment plans immediately following a technology shock as physical constraints and lags
in decision-making may prevent them from increasing physical investment immediately. As
a result, investment may not respond immediately to certain shocks, but rather, respond
with a lag. Similarly, we can use economic theory to impose restrictions on the long-
run response of some variables to some shocks. This idea is used in many papers, for
example in Gal´ı (1999) who assumes that technology shocks are the only shocks that have
a permanent effect on labour productivity. He derives this restriction from a neoclassical
production function.
Identifying shocks using short-run and long-run restrictions however are not without
any drawbacks. The limitations of both of these approaches are well discussed in the
literature (Kilian (2013)). In recent years, VARs that identify structural shocks by sign
restrictions have become more popular. The sign restriction approach was pioneered by
Faust (1998) in the context of identifying monetary policy shocks. One of the advantages
of sign restriction is that there is no need to impose linear restrictions between the reduced
form and structural errors. In this way, sign restrictions are more flexible than imposing
restrictions on the impact matrix or on the long-run matrix. In sign identified structural
VARs, restrictions are imposed on the sign of the responses of some variables to some
structural shocks. The source of restrictions usually takes the form of the impulse response
functions from a DSGE model or in some cases, a partial equilibrium model. Unlike short-
run and long-run restrictions, sign restrictions do not imply a unique point estimate but
rather a set of models that are consistent with the imposed restrictions. These structural
responses are admissible as long as they satisfy the set of identifying restrictions imposed
by the researcher.
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A VAR that combines short and long-run restrictions as in Bjørnland and Leitemo
(2009) cannot be solved using a lower triangular Cholesky decomposition of the long-run
covariance matrix since the solution involves solving a non-linear problem. In their paper,
Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) propose an alternative approach to transform the non-linear
problem into a linear one using a QR decomposition.4 They introduce an efficient algorithm
by imposing short and long-run restrictions in exactly identified models. Their main idea
is to use the QR decomposition to find an appropriate rotation matrix that satisfies the
zero short-run and long-run restrictions imposed by the researcher. Binning (2013) extends
the methodology of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) to models that do not have enough zero
restrictions and thus are not globally defined. In the case where there are not enough zero
restrictions, the model will produce a set of impulse response functions that may or may
not be consistent with theory. Sign restrictions based on a model can then be used to
discard all the impulse response functions that are not consistent with theory. This will
produce a band of impulse response functions that are consistent with the zero, as well as
with the theory based sign restrictions imposed by the researcher.
3.3.1 Exactly Identified Models with Short and Long-run Re-
strictions
We explain the methodology of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) for exactly identified models
and Binning (2013) methodology for underidentified models using a stylized VAR model.
Once the methodology is explained, we describe the specific VAR we use to analyse the
interconnectedness between stock prices and monetary policy.
4The QR decomposition of a matrix is a procedure in linear algebra which decomposes a matrix A into
a product Q and R (that is, A = QR) such that Q is an orthogonal matrix and R is an upper triangular
matrix.
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Consider the following structural representation of a VAR(q) model
B0zt = B1zt−1 +B2zt−2 + · · ·+Bqzt−q + t = BZt−1 + t (3.1)
where zt is a vector of endogenous variables, Z
′
t−1 = [z
′
t−1, z
′
t−2 · · · zt−q], B = [B1, B2 · · · , Bq]
and t is a vector of structural shocks. The reduced-form representation of the VAR(q) is
given by:
zt = A1zt−1 + A2zt−2 + · · ·+ Aqzt−q + ut = AZt−1 + ut (3.2)
where A = [A1, A2 · · · , Aq] = B−10 B and ut is a vector of reduced-form shocks. The
reduced-form VAR can be estimated by OLS. We can see that the structural shocks are
linear combinations of the reduced form shocks since ut = B
−1
0 t ⇔ t = B0ut. If we assume
that the structural shocks are uncorrelated and have unit variance, such that E(t
T
t ) = I,
using the reduced form covariance matrix, we can show that:
E(utu
T
t ) = (B
−1
0 )E(t
T
t )(B
−1
0 )
T = (B−10 )(B
−1
0 )
T = Σ (3.3)
Knowledge of the reduced form parameters from OLS estimation does not allow us
to pin down a unique B−10 without any identifying restrictions, as there are many B
−1
0
matrices that satisfy (B−10 )(B
−1
0 )
T = Σ. In the case of a recursive identification or Cholesky
decomposition, the matrix B−10 is lower triangular. If we assume that matrix V is a
Cholesky lower triangular matrix that satisfies V V T = Σ where V = B−10 , then there
exists an orthogonal matrix K such that (B−10 )(B
−1
0 )
T = V KKTV T = V V T .
To illustrate the methodology of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) for exactly identified
models with short and long-run restrictions, we use a stylized VAR model with three
variables (m = 3). The VAR is specified as [∆Y pi R] where ∆Y represents the growth
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rate in output, pi the growth rate in the CPI and R is the short-term nominal interest rate.
All variables used in the VAR are assumed to be I(0), that is, stationary. We assume that
there are three shocks in the VAR: monetary policy, demand and supply. Since we have
three variables, to exactly identify the VAR, we need to impose three zero restrictions. As
an illustration, we assume that a monetary policy shock does not have a contemporaneous
effect on output. Moreover, we assume that demand and monetary policy shocks have no
effect on output in the long-run. These three restrictions exactly identify the model. In
this case, the impact matrix B−10 is given by:
B−10 =

MP D S
∆Y 0 × ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×
 (3.4)
The long-run restrictions imply that the long-run matrix is given by:
Θ1 = A(1)
−1B−10 =

MP D S
∆Y 0 0 ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×
 (3.5)
where A(1) = (I3 − A) = (I3 − A1 − A2 − A3)
The algorithm of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) consists of constructing a draw for Θ1
using matrix A and an initial draw from the short-run impact multiplier matrix C =
chol(Σˆ).5 They label the short-run impact matrix L0 = B
−1
0 and the long-run matrix
5Our explanation of the algorithm follows closely the description contained in Rubio-Ramı´rez et al.
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L∞ = Θ1 = A(1)−1B−10 . L0 and L∞ are both m ×m. Hence, we first have L∗0 = C and
L∗∞ = [I − A]−1 × C. The initial impulse response function consistent with the matrix C
is then stacked into a single matrix denoted by f(B,A) where
f(B,A) = L =
 L0
L∞
 =

MP D S
∆Y 0 × ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×
∆Y 0 0 ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×

(3.6)
The L matrix therefore contains m structural shocks and 2m variables. Rubio-Ramı´rez
et al. (2010) show that zero restrictions imposed on each structural shock can be represented
in terms of matrix Qj where the number of columns in Qj is equal to the number of rows
in L, that is 2m. If the rank of Qj is qj, then qj is also the number of zero restrictions
associated with the jth shock. They show that the zero restrictions imposed on each shock
are satisfied if and only if
QjLej = 0 (3.7)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and where ej is the jth column of Im. Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) re-order
the columns in L from highest rank to lowest rank for the corresponding Qj matrix. Using
our stylized VAR, the restrictions for the three shocks can be written as
(2010) and Binning (2013).
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Q1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , Q2 =

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , Q3 = 03×6
Q1 contains the restriction that monetary policy shocks affect output with a lag in the
short-run and have no effect on output in the long-run. Q2 contains the restriction that
demand shocks do not have any permanent effect on output. Q3 contains no restrictions
and is thus a matrix of zeros. It follows that the SVAR is exactly identified if and only
if qj = m − j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Once this is achieved, each QjL for j = m is calculated
and a QR decomposition is performed on each. The last column of the orthogonal matrix
obtained by applying the QR decomposition for each j is then used to construct a rotation
matrix. The rotation matrix is multiplied by L0 to find the structural impact multiplier
matrix. In our example, for all three shocks to be identified, the rank condition for the
first, second and third shock must respectively be q1 = 2, q2 = 1 and q1 = 0. It is clear
that our model is exactly identified.
3.3.2 Underidentified Models with Short-run, Long-run and Sign
Restrictions
We use the same stylized VAR to extend the methodology to models that are underiden-
tified. We assume this time the following restrictions
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f(B,A) = L =
 L0
L∞
 =

MP U U
∆Y 0 × ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×
∆Y 0 × ×
pi × × ×
R × × ×

(3.8)
The only shock we identify is a monetary policy shock. The other two shocks are left
undefined and we assume that monetary policy affects output with a lag and has no effect
on output in the long-run. In this case the Q matrices will be given by:
Q1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , Q2 = Q3 = 03×6
where Q1 includes the restriction that monetary policy does not affect output contempo-
raneously and monetary policy is neutral in the long-run. For the model to be exactly
identified, the rank conditions for the first, second and third shock must respectively be
q1 = 2, q2 = 1 and q1 = 0. With the restrictions we imposed, the rank conditions for
the first, second and third shocks are respectively 2,0,0. Hence the first shock is uniquely
identified but the other two shocks are not, as for j = 2, 3, qj < m−j. As a result, we have
an under-identified model. The under-identified SVAR will generate a band of impulse
response functions that are consistent with the reduced-form VAR. Binning (2013) applies
sign restrictions with the zero restrictions to discard all the impulse response functions
that are inconsistent with the restrictions imposed by the researcher.
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In terms of algorithm, in the under-identified model, Binning (2013) shows that one of
the key differences is that the initial short-run impact matrix used in L is randomized by
post-multiplying the Cholesky matrix C by a rotation matrix calculated from Q. This is
done as the model is under-identified and by doing so, L is now constructed from a set of
models consistent with the reduced form VAR and the imposed zero restrictions. Once this
is done, a second rotation matrix is constructed using the same procedure as in the fully
identified VAR and an impulse response function is generated. If the impulse response
function satisfies the sign restrictions imposed, the draw is kept, otherwise it is discarded.
In many cases, the sign restrictions will come from a model. In our example, we could
use a simple New Keynesian three equation model to generate the sign restrictions on the
impulse responses of each of the variables. Since the VAR model would match exactly the
simple New Keynesian model, this could be executed fairly easily.
3.4 VAR Model with Stock Prices
The baseline VAR that we employ in this paper is a six variable monthly VAR consisting
of industrial production (IP), inflation, (pi) commodity prices (Pcom), short-term interest
rates (i), stock market index (sm) and an index measuring consumer confidence (conf).
We use a stationary VAR and the yearly growth rate of each variable is taken when there
is evidence of non-stationarity. We test for the optimal number of lags and several of
the tests we employ for lag-selection suggest four lags. We identify only five shocks in
the VAR: a demand (d), supply (s), monetary policy (mp), stock market (sm) and a
confidence shock (c). The sixth shock is left unidentified (u). Since we have 6 variables, to
exactly identify the VAR, we would require 15 zero restrictions. If we employ a recursive
identification as many papers employ in this literature, this would involve making strong
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assumptions regarding the timing of the response of each variable to the six shocks. In
particular, we would be forced to make an assumption about the ordering of stock prices
and interest rates and in doing so, explicitly assume whether or not they react with a lag
or contemporaneously to each other. Many studies order stock prices after the interest
rate variable, thereby assuming that stock prices react contemporaneously to a monetary
policy shock but interest rate reacts with a lag to a shock in stock prices. We show later
that this type of ordering leads to the right response for stock prices following a monetary
policy shock but to the wrong response for interest rates following a stock market shock.
As we have argued in this paper, we take an agnostic view about how certain variables
respond to shocks in the short-run and we use the following minimal restrictions in the
baseline model:6
(i) Monetary policy and demand shocks have no long-run effect on industrial production
With our set-up, we have the following L matrix:
6We are aware that being agnostic is no “free lunch” as it involves a larger set of models (possibly
problematic) to be retained in the admissible set. This remains an unresolved question in the literature.
For this reason, we provide some robustness tests on our identification strategy and we find that our results
are robust.
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L =
 L0
L∞
 =

D MP S U SM C
∆IP x x x x x x
pi x x x x x x
∆Pcom x x x x x x
i x x x x x x
∆Stock market x x x x x x
Confidence x x x x x x
∆IP 0 0 x x x x
pi x x x x x x
∆Pcom x x x x x x
i x x x x x x
∆Stock market x x x x x x
Confidence x x x x x x

(3.9)
where the rows describe the variables and the columns the associated shocks. In this case
the Q matrices will be given by:
Q1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Q2 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Q3 = Q4 = Q5 = Q6 = 06×12
where the matrices Q1 and Q2 respectively include the restrictions that demand and mon-
etary policy shocks are neutral in the long-run. Clearly, with the imposed restrictions,
the rank conditions are not satisfied and the model is underidentified. As we discussed
earlier, for the model to be exactly identified, the rank condition for the six shocks must
respectively be q1 = 5, q2 = 4, q3 = 3, q4 = 2, q5 = 1 and q6 = 0. With the restrictions we
imposed, the rank condition for the six shocks are respectively 1,1,0,0,0,0. Consequently,
the model is underidentified.
3.5 DSGE Model with Stock Prices
We use a simple DSGE model with monetary policy, stock prices and confidence shocks to
impose restrictions on the sign of the IRF on impact in the SVAR. As the model is similar
to Nistico´ (2012) and other papers, except for the confidence shock, we do not provide a
detailed account of the model. Nistico´ (2012) extends the Blanchard-Yaari perpetual youth
model with the inclusion of equities (see Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985)). The model
shares many common features with the simple New Keynesian model and the linearized
version is given by the following equations:
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xt =
1
1 + ψ
Etxt+1 +
ψ
1 + ψ
st − 1
σ
[ir − Etpit+1 − rnt ] (3.10)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + 
pi
t (3.11)
st = βEtst+1 + λEtxt+1 − [ir − Etpit+1 − rnt ] + st (3.12)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [rnt + φpipit + φxxt + φsst] + mpt (3.13)
pit = γpi
pi
t−1 + η
pi
t (3.14)
mpt = γmp
mp
t−1 + η
mp
t (3.15)
st = γs
s
t−1 + conft−4 + η
s
t (3.16)
Equation 3.10 is a forward-looking IS-type relation that relates the output-gap xt to its
expected future value, real stock prices st and the real short-term interest rate (it−Etpit+1).
In the model, agents can allocate their portfolio between a riskless asset and equities issued
by monopolistically competitive firms. Real stock prices affect the output-gap in this
model through wealth-effects on private consumption. Equation 3.11 is the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. Equation 3.12 describes the dynamics of real stock prices. Real stock prices
are driven by its expected future value, the expected value of output in the future, the
difference between the real rate and the neutral (or natural) interest rate and a stochastic
shock. The stochastic shock driving stock prices is described in Equation 3.16. We assume
that stock prices are driven by its own shock given by st and another fundamental shock
which we interpret as a confidence shock. Our confidence shock takes a similar form
as news shocks in the literature (see Matsumoto et al. (2011), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) and Fratzscher and Straub (2013) for example). These confidence shocks represent
information about expectations of consumers and firms regarding the future fundamentals
of the economy. Surveys of firm and consumer sentiment can provide information about
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how optimistic or pessimistic consumers and firms are regarding future uncertainty which
in turn can have implications for stock prices and real economic activity. Equation 3.13
depicts the reaction function of the central bank. The central bank is assumed to react
to stock prices directly in addition to the output-gap and inflation. The rest of the model
describes the behaviour of the shocks in the model.
The model is calibrated using similar values as Nistico´ (2012). Figure C.1 in Appendix C
presents the impulse response of the model following a shock to the short-term interest rate.
As expected, the output-gap, inflation and stock market all fall following an increase in the
short-term interest rate. Figures C.2 and C.3 show the impulse response function from the
model following a stock market shock and a confidence shock respectively. A positive shock
in the stock market leads to an increase in the output-gap, interest rates and inflation. In
the model, the shock to the stock market creates a positive wealth effect that leads to an
increase in output and firms who are able to change their prices take advantage of the
increase in the demand for their goods by increasing prices. The nominal interest rate
increases since the central bank in its Taylor rule reacts to the increase in these variables.
Figure C.3 shows that an expected boost in confidence increases the output-gap, inflation
and interest rates. The effect on the output-gap and the other variables is fairly large. The
confidence shock as modelled is anticipated expectations about future fundamentals. The
shock has an immediate effect on stock prices which in turn has a positive wealth effect
on consumers and hence output. The increase in demand leads to an increase in prices
as firms who are able to change prices in any given period do so to take advantage of the
change. The shock from confidence is more persistent than the other shocks in the model.
We use the responses from our stylized model to impose the sign restrictions in our
VAR. We should point out that our small DSGE model does not map directly into our
VAR as we are employing a VAR model that contains more variables such as commodity
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prices.7 In the VAR, we treat confidence as an endogenous variable rather than driven by
completely exogenous factors. Moreover, the confidence shock in the VAR is also assumed
to be unanticipated whereas in the theoretical model the confidence shock is anticipated.
Nevertheless, the stylized model is still informative regarding the correlation between these
variables and the signs they take on impact.
3.6 Underidentified VAR with Stock Prices
The L stacked matrix with our zero and sign restrictions is given by matrix 3.17. In addition
to the zero restrictions in the long-run, we assume that monetary policy shocks have a
positive impact on interest rates and a negative impact on the stock market, industrial
production and inflation. All of these restrictions come from our small stylized model. We
assume that a demand shock has a positive effect on industrial production and inflation
while a supply shock has a positive effect on industrial production but a negative effect on
inflation. Using the responses from the model, we assume that a positive shock from the
stock market has a positive impact on industrial production, inflation, interest rates and
the confidence index. All of these responses are consistent with the DSGE model. Finally,
the sixth shock is left completely unidentified.
7In our robustness test, we employ a smaller VAR that maps more directly into the small theoretical
model.
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 L0
L∞
 =

D MP S U SM C
∆IP + − + x + +
pi + − − x + x
∆Pcom x x x x x x
i x + x x + x
∆Stock market x − x x + +
Confidence x x x x + +
∆IP 0 0 x x x x
pi x x x x x x
∆Pcom x x x x x x
i x x x x x x
∆Stock market x x x x x x
Confidence x x x x x x

(3.17)
3.6.1 Data
We use monthly data from January 1980 to December 2017. For Canada, we use data
on industrial production, total CPI, the overnight rate, the TSX/S&P stock index, the
Bank of Canada non-energy commodity price index, and the OECD consumer confidence
index. The OECD consumer confidence index for Canada surveys households about their
current and expectations of future economic situation and their current and expected
major purchases. For the U.S, we use the industrial production, total CPI, the federal
funds rate, the S&P 500 stock index, the world bank index of non-energy commodity
prices and the index of consumer sentiment from the University of Michigan Survey of
Consumers. This survey contains approximately 50 questions that track consumer attitudes
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and expectations about the economy. Consumer confidence has historically been a good
predictor of consumer spending for the next three to six months.8 Each series is tested for
stationarity and the year over year growth rate is taken when we needed to transform the
data. In our VAR, only the interest rate and the confidence index are in levels whereas all
other variables are employed as their rate of change.9 Figures C.4 and C.5 in Appendix C
show the data utilised for both countries.
3.7 Results with Short-Run Identification
We first report the results for the VAR where we employ short-run restrictions to identify
the monetary and stock market shocks. The results are shown in Figure 3.1 below and
Figures C.6 — C.9 in Appendix C. As the first panel of Figure 3.1 shows, if we employ a
short-run recursive identification scheme and we assume that stock prices react with a lag
to a monetary policy shock, then a positive monetary policy shock leads to an increase in
stock prices for Canada (the red solid line). The response of stock prices shows how the
recursive assumption with this particular ordering can lead to a counterfactual response
for stock prices. We obtain the expected response if the ordering is reversed. That is,
stock prices fall following a positive monetary policy shock if we assume that monetary
policy reacts with a lag to stock prices. This is the ordering used in the vast majority
of papers that employ this type of identification scheme. However doing this leads to a
counterfactual response for interest rate following a stock market shock. As shown in the
third panel of Figure 3.1, we find that the policy rate in Canada falls following a shock to
8The University of Michigan Survey of Consumers is the most commonly used measure in the literature
to assess confidence for the U.S. We also run the model with the OECD consumer confidence index for
the U.S. and obtained fairly similar results to those reported.
9We also test our data for structural breaks. Our results were very similar whether a dummy was used
to account for possible breaks at the beginning of the 1980s and for the 2007-2008 recession.
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Figure 3.1: Response of Stock Prices and Interest Rates to Shocks in Canada
and the U.S. using a Short-run Identification
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Notes: Response of stock prices (to a positive interest rate shock) and interest rates (to a positive stock
price shock) in Canada and the U.S. using a short-run identification.
stock prices (the blue dashed line). This result is at odds with many empirical findings and
is also not supported by the DSGE model we employ in the paper. As shown in Figure
C.6, the response of some macro variables is also incorrect following a monetary policy
shock. Industrial production increases following a positive monetary policy shock when we
assume that stock prices react with a lag to a monetary policy shock.
As shown in Figure 3.1, when U.S. data is employed, we find that stock prices fall fol-
lowing a monetary policy shock, while interest rates rise following a positive shock to stock
prices. The results are robust to the ordering of stock prices and interest rates. However,
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we obtain some counterfactual responses for industrial production and inflation following a
positive monetary policy shock as shown in Figure C.8. They both increase following a rise
in the Federal Funds rate. This counterfactual response vanishes if inflation and industrial
production are allowed to react contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock as in our
underidentified VAR. Thus monetary VARs that employ a recursive identification strategy
in this context, can lead to counterfactual responses. For this reason and the fact that
empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy and stock prices react to each other si-
multaneously, we argue that this type of identification procedure can be problematic when
we specifically aim to study the interaction between stock prices and monetary policy.
3.8 Results with the Underidentified VAR
Results from the underidentified VAR are shown in Figures 3.2 - 3.6. We simulate the model
1000 times and report the vector of pointwise posterior median responses of the impulse
response function from the VAR as well as the pointwise 68% posterior confidence bands.
Results from the monetary policy shock for Canada and the U.S. are shown respectively in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. An increase in the interest rate leads to an immediate fall in industrial
production, inflation, commodity prices and the stock market in both countries. The fall
in stock prices following the increase in interest rates is consistent with the decrease in
industrial production, as the higher cost of borrowing and the increase in the discount rate
when combined, depresses stock prices. It takes approximately 10 months in the U.S. and
5 months in Canada for the stock market to increase above its initial value. As interest
rate decline back to its initial level and industrial production starts to recover from its
trough, these contribute to expectations of higher future profits and dividends for firms
and hence, result in higher stock prices.
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Figure 3.2: Response of SVAR Model to a Monetary Policy Shock in Canada
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From Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we find that an increase of 25 basis points in the overnight
rate leads to a fall of about 1.75% in stock prices in Canada, whereas a similar increase in
the U.S. federal funds rate leads to a fall of about 1.25% in stock prices. Our results are
in line with Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005) who also find similar estimates for the U.S. Their estimates range between
0.75% and 1.25%. Our results however, are different from Li et al. (2010) for Canada.
They find that stock prices fall by around 0.8% following a 25 basis points increase in
the overnight rate. They also report a much smaller impact of monetary policy on stock
prices in Canada compared to the U.S. Our results are likely different due to differences
in identification strategies. Whereas they identified all the shocks in a 7 variable VAR,
we decided not to impose such rigid assumptions on the causal relationship among the
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Figure 3.3: Response of SVAR model to a Monetary Policy Shock in the U.S.
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variables in the model but instead let the data reveal these causal relationships. We
believe our approach is more robust and less sensitive to ordering assumptions.
The impact of monetary policy shocks is larger in Canada compared to the U.S. for two
reasons. Firstly, the TSX index has a heavy concentration of companies in the financial,
energy, industrials and materials sectors compared to the U.S. stock index. In 2017, taken
together, these sectors accounted for over 75% of the TSX index and only about 33% of
the S&P index for the U.S. On the other hand, sectors that are less sensitive to interest
rate changes such as telecoms, utilities, health care and consumer staples account for a
much lager share of the U.S stock market (28%) compared to the Canadian stock market
(13%). Figure 3.4 shows the share of each of the 11 sectors in Canada and in the U.S. in
2017.
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Figure 3.4: TSX and S&P 500 Sector Weightings in 2017
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It is evident from the graph that the share of sectors that are more sensitive to interest
rate changes such as financial, energy, materials and industrials are much larger in Canada
than in the U.S. Since these sectors are more sensitive to changes in interest rates compared
to other sectors such as consumer staples, utilities and telecoms which account for a much
larger share of the index in the U.S, it is not surprising that monetary policy has a larger
impact on stock prices in Canada compared to the U.S. Secondly, the stock market in
Canada responds more to domestic credit conditions than in the U.S. This occurs as the
percentage of sales to foreign countries is higher for companies in the U.S. compared to
Canadian companies. As a result, Canadian companies are more dependent on demand
and credit conditions at home than U.S. companies. According to Goldman Sachs, foreign
sales accounted for 44% of total revenue for U.S. companies that were part of the S&P 500
in 2016.10
10We do not have a comparable figure for Canada, but since financial companies account for approx-
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Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the response of short-term interest rates and other variables
to a positive stock market shock in Canada and the U.S. respectively.
Figure 3.5: Response of SVAR Model to a Stock Market Shock in Canada
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A positive stock market shock leads to an increase in industrial production, inflation,
interest rates and commodity prices in both countries. As in the DSGE model, the increase
in the stock market has a positive wealth effect on consumers and increases investment for
firms. The consumer confidence index increases following the stock market shock in Canada
and the U.S. We find that in Canada, a 1% increase in the stock market leads to an increase
of approximately 27 basis points in the overnight rate whereas a similar increase leads to
an approximately 10 basis points increase in the federal funds rate. Our results for the
imately 35% of the TSX index and as they derive a large share of their revenue domestically, it is very
likely that foreign sales account for less of the total revenues of all of the companies listed on the TSX
compared to the US.
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Figure 3.6: Response of SVAR Model to a Stock Market Shock in the U.S.
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U.S. are in the range of results found by other papers. For example, many of the papers
cited previously have an estimated range from 2 to 10 basis points for the U.S. The Bank
of Canada reacts more strongly to the stock market shock as the initial impact of the shock
on inflation and industrial production is much more pronounced in Canada than in the
U.S. In Canada, a 1% increase in stock prices lead to a 0.17% rise in inflation and to an
increase of 0.24% in industrial production. In the U.S, for a similar increase in stock prices,
inflation rose by only 0.05% and industrial production by 0.09%.
3.9 Robustness
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate the same VAR this time imposing the
common assumption that industrial output and inflation react with a lag to a monetary
128
policy shock. All remaining identifying assumptions are the same as before. Our results
are depicted in Figures C.10 – C.13 of Appendix C. When we impose these two additional
short-run restrictions, we find that a 25 basis point increase in the policy rate leads to a fall
of 1.93% in Canadian stock prices and to a fall of 1.45% for the U.S. These results are very
similar to the ones we obtain when we employed the baseline VAR, and in fact are within
the 68% confidence interval of the baseline model. Note that with these minimal number
of short-run restrictions, as opposed to employing a fully identified recursive scheme, we
obtain responses for industrial production and inflation for the U.S. which are in line with
real world observations and economic theory. They both fall following an increase in the
policy rate. On the other hand, when Canadian data is employed, although industrial
production falls following a policy rate increase, we obtain a price puzzle, which we did
not have in the baseline model. For the stock market shock, we find that a 1% increase
in the stock markets leads to an approximate 35 basis point change in the policy rate in
Canada and to an approximate 8 basis point change in the policy rate in the U.S. These
results are again very similar to the results we obtain in the baseline VAR.
We also perform another robustness check by using a smaller VAR with only 4 variables
– industrial production, inflation, the interest rate and a measure of stock prices. We use
the same identification as in the baseline case, that is we impose only the restrictions that
demand and monetary policy shocks are neutral in the long-run. Our results are shown in
Figures C.14 – C.17 of Appendix C. Using the 4-variable VAR, we find that an increase
of 25 basis points in the overnight rate leads to a fall of about 0.6% in stock prices in
Canada, whereas a similar increase in the U.S. federal funds rate leads to a fall of about
1% in stock prices. The response of the stock market in Canada is smaller than in the
U.S. when this model is employed and the median responses for both countries are smaller
than those obtained in the baseline model. Regarding the shock to stock prices, using the
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4-variable VAR, we find that in Canada, a 1% increase in the stock market leads to an
increase of about 15 basis points in the overnight rate, whereas a similar increase leads to
about a 7 basis points increase in the federal funds rate. Again these results though similar
in direction to those obtained in the baseline VAR are all lower in magnitude.11
3.10 Conclusion
We investigate the interconnectedness between stock prices and monetary policy using an
underidentified SVAR for Canada and the U.S. We allow stock market and monetary policy
to simultaneously react to each other through a combination of short-run, long-run and
sign restrictions. We also impose a minimal set of restrictions on the rest of the model, and
thereby allow the data to reveal the relationship among the different variables in the VAR.
Our results for the U.S are in line with many previous studies. Our study provides new
insights on the relationship between stock prices and monetary policy in Canada. We find
that stock prices react more strongly to monetary policy shocks in Canada compared to
the U.S. and argue that this is mainly due to the composition of the TSX index compared
to the S&P 500. Sectors such as financial and energy are fairly sensitive to movements
in interest rates and these sectors account for approximately 60% of the index in Canada
whereas they account for a much smaller share in the U.S. (see Figure 3.4). We also
show that using a fully identified recursive strategy in the context of a monetary VAR,
can lead to counterfactual results for some macro variables. We do not obtain any such
counterfactual results when we employ our underidentified VAR.
11We also employ the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P/TSX 60 for Canada to test for the
robustness of our results. We find very similar results when these stock indices are employed.
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over 40% of total non-residential capital investment in Canada. 
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that by 2040, the 
world will need 32% more energy than is being produced today.
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Table A.1: Data Description Table
Data Data Source Data Description
US CPI FRED Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers:
All Items, Index 1982-1984=100, Monthly, Season-
ally Adjusted;
series identifier - CPIAUCSL
US Industrial Production FRED Industrial Production Index, Index 2012=100,
Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted;
series identifier - INDPRO
Federal Funds Rate FRED Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Monthly,
Not Seasonally Adjusted;
series identifier - FEDFUNDS
Commodity Price Index CANSIM Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index - a chain
Fisher price index of the spot or transaction prices
in U.S. dollars of 24 commodities produced in
Canada and sold in world markets. Commodity
weights are updated on an quarterly basis using
recent commodity production and price data, In-
dex 1972=100.
series identifier - v52673496
CAN/US Exchange Rate CANSIM CDN$ per US$, noon spot rate, average;
series identifier - v37426
Domestic Interest Rate CANSIM Canada Overnight Money Market Rate;
series identifier - v122514
Domestic CPI CANSIM Consumer Price Index: All Items, Index
2002=100, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted;
series identifier - v41690914
Total GVA CANSIM GDP at basic prices, by North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), monthly, Chained
(2007) dollars; All industries
series identifier - v65201210
Industry GVA CANSIM GDP at basic prices, by NAICS, monthly, Chained
(2007) dollars; various industries
series identifier - multiple series identifiers taken
from Table 379-0031
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) - a financial and economic database maintained by the Research
Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
CANSIM - Canadian Socioeconomic Database. Provided and maintained by Statistics Canada
GVA - Gross Value Added. This is total industry output net of inputs.
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Appendix B
Technical Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Schematic Overview of the Model
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B.2 How the Model is Solved
A DSGE model may be characterised as a collection of first-order and equilibrium condi-
tions that assume the general form:1
Et{f(xt+1, xt, xt−1, ut; θ)} = 0 (B.1)
Et(ut) = 0
Et(utu
′
t) = Σu
(B.2)
where
f(·) are functional forms
x is a vector of endogenous variables
u is a vector of exogenous stochastic shocks and
θ is a vector of parameters
The solution to this system, the DSGE model, is a set of policy functions which are defined
as a set of equations that relate the current values of the variables to their past values and
to the current shocks while satisfying the set of equations given in B.1. This policy function
we denote as:
xt = g(xt−1, ut) (B.3)
To derive the policy function we begin as follows: we first note that equation B.3 may be
iterated forward to give us xt+1:
1This section closely follows the exposition given in the Dynare User Guide
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xt+1 = g(xt, ut+1)
= g(g(xt−1, ut), ut+1)
(B.4)
A new function F may then be defined, such that:
F (xt−1, ut, ut+1) = f(g(g(xt−1, ut), ut+1)
xt+1
, g(xt−1, ut)
xt
, xt−1
xt−1
, ut
ut
) (B.5)
Equation B.5 allows us to rewrite our system in B.1, in terms of past variables, current
shocks and future shocks:
Et[F (xt−1, ut, ut+1); θ] = 0 (B.6)
The non-stochastic steady state of the DSGE model given in equation B.1 is defined as:
f(x¯, x¯, x¯, 0) = 0 (B.7)
having the property that:
x¯ = g(x¯, 0) (B.8)
where x¯ is the steady-state value of x.
We can therefore linearise the re-written system given in equation B.6 by taking the First-
order Taylor series approximation of it around this steady state:
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Et
{
F (1)(xt−1, ut, ut+1)
}
= Et
{
f(x¯, x¯, x¯) + fxt+1(gxt−1(gxt−1xˆt−1 + gutut) + gutut+1)
+ fxt(gxt−1xˆt−1 + gutut) + fxt−1xˆt−1 + futut
}
= 0
(B.9)
where xˆt−1 = xt−1 − x¯, fxt+1 = ∂f∂xt+1 and gxt−1 =
∂g
∂xt−1
Taking expectations we get:
Et
{
F (1)(xt−1, ut, ut+1)
}
= f(x¯, x¯, x¯) + fxt+1(gxt−1(gxt−1xˆt−1 + gutut))
+ fxt(gxt−1xˆt−1 + gutut) + fxt−1xˆt−1 + futut
= (fxt+1gxt−1gxt−1 + fxtgxt−1 + fxt−1)xˆt−1 + (fxt+1gxt−1gut + fxtgut + fut)ut
= 0
(B.10)
Since future shocks, ut+1, only enter equation B.9 with their first moments, they drop out
after taking expectations of the linearised equations.2 We have two unknown variables
in equation B.10. These are gxt−1 and gut , each of which will help us recover the policy
function g.
Since equation B.10 holds for any xˆt−1 and any ut, the value of each parenthesis must
necessarily be zero. Thus, we can solve each bracketed expression sequentially. Working
with the first, gives us a quadratic expression which can be solved for gxt−1 . Having
recovered gxt−1 , we then proceed in a relatively straightforward manner to recover gut from
2If we recall from equation B.2, the expected value of these error terms are assumed to be zero.
158
the second parenthesis.
Finally, notice that a first-order linearisation of equation B.3, which is the policy func-
tion g, yields:
xt = x¯+ gxt−1xˆt−1 + gutut (B.11)
And now that we have gxt−1 and gut , we have derived the approximate policy function
and have succeeded in solving our DSGE model. To assess the impact of shocks on the
model via impulse response functions, we would simply iterate the policy function, B.11,
starting from an initial value given by the steady state.
B.3 Household Optimisation Problem
The representative household chooses Ct, Hj,t, Kj,t+1, Ij,t, bt and b
∗
t to maximise utility,
equation 2.1, subject to the budget constraint, equation 2.3, and the capital accumulation
equation 2.5:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
ξc,tln (Ct − dCt−1)− AL
[
H1+ςn,t +H
1+ς
m,t +H
1+ς
x,t
] 1+χ
1+ς
1 + χ
 (B.12)
subject to
Ct + It +
bt
Rt
+
qtb
∗
t
κtR∗t
=
∑
j=n,m,x
(rj,tKj,t + wj,tHj,t) +
bt−1
pit
+
qtb
∗
t−1
pi∗t
+ rl,tL+ Γt − τt (B.13)
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and
Kj,t+1 = (1− δ)Kj,t + Υt
[
1− Φk
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− µ
)2]
Ij,t (B.14)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[ξc,tln (Ct − dCt−1)− AL
[
H1+ςn,t +H
1+ς
m,t +H
1+ς
x,t
] 1+χ
1+ς
1 + χ
−
λt
{
Ct + It +
bt
Rt
+
qtb
∗
t
κtR∗t
−
∑
j=n,m,x
(rj,tKj,t + wj,tHj,t)− bt−1
pit
− qtb
∗
t−1
pi∗t
− rl,tL− Γt + τt
}
−
λkj,t
{
Kj,t+1 − (1− δ)Kj,t − Υt
[
1− Φk
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− µ
)2]
Ij,t
}]
(B.15)
FOC w.r.t. Ct:
∂L
∂Ct
: βtξc,t
1
Ct − dCt−1 − β
tλt − βt+1ξc,t+1 d
Ct+1 − dCt = 0 (B.16)
which implies:
λt = ξc,t
1
Ct − dCt−1 − βξc,t+1
d
Ct+1 − dCt (B.17)
λt = ξc,t(Ct − dCt−1)−1 − dβξc,t+1(Ct+1 − dCt)−1 (B.18)
FOC w.r.t. Hj,t: (for j = n,m, x)
∂L
∂Hj,t
: −βtAL 1
1 + ς
[
H1+ςn,t +H
1+ς
m,t +H
1+ς
x,t
]χ−ς
1+ς (1 + ς)Hςj,t + β
tλtwj,t = 0 (B.19)
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which implies:
λtwj,t = AL
[
H1+ςn,t +H
1+ς
m,t +H
1+ς
x,t
]χ−ς
1+ς Hςj,t (B.20)
λtwj,t = ALH
χ−ς
t H
ς
j,t (B.21)
FOC w.r.t. Kj,t+1: (for j = n,m, x)
∂L
∂Kj,t+1
: −βtλkj,t + βt+1λkj,t+1(1− δ) + βt+1λt+1rj,t+1 = 0 (B.22)
which implies:
λkj,t = βλ
k
j,t+1(1− δ) + βλt+1rj,t+1 (B.23)
FOC w.r.t. Ij,t: (for j = n,m, x)
∂L
∂Ij,t
: − βtλt + βtλkj,tΥt
[
1− Φk
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− µ
)2]
− βtλkj,tΥtΦk
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− µ
)
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
+ βt+1λkj,t+1Υt+1Φk
(
Ij,t+1
Ij,t
− µ
)(
Ij,t+1
Ij,t
)2
= 0
(B.24)
FOC w.r.t. bt:
∂L
∂bt
: −βt λt
Rt
+ βt+1
λt+1
pit+1
= 0 (B.25)
which implies:
λt
Rt
= β
λt+1
pit+1
(B.26)
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FOC w.r.t. b∗t :
∂L
∂b∗t
: −βt λtqt
κtR∗t
+ βt+1
λt+1qt+1
pi∗t+1
= 0 (B.27)
which implies:
qtλt
κtR∗t
= β
λt+1qt+1
pi∗t+1
(B.28)
B.4 Non-Tradable Firm Optimisation Problem
B.4.1 Cost-minimisation Problem
Non-tradable good producers choose the most efficient level of input subject to their avail-
able level of technology. That is, they minimize input costs given factor prices and thus
firm i faces the following cost minimisation problem:
min Wn,tHn,it +Rn,tKn,it + Px,tY
n
x,it (B.29)
subject to
Yn,it = An,t (µtHn,it)
αn (Kn,it)
γn
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn
(B.30)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L = Wn,tHn,it+Rn,tKn,it+Px,tY nx,it+MCn,it
[
Yn,it − An,t (µtHn,it)αn (Kn,it)γn
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn]
(B.31)
FOC w.r.t. Hn,it:
∂L
∂Hn,it
: Wn,t −MCn,itαnAn,t (µtHn,it)αn H−1n,it (Kn,it)γn
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn
= 0 (B.32)
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Wn,t = MCn,itαn
Yn,it
Hn,it
(B.33)
FOC w.r.t. Kn,it:
∂L
∂Kn,it
: Rn,t −MCn,itγnAn,t (µtHn,it)αn (Kn,it)γn−1
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn
= 0 (B.34)
Rn,t = MCn,itγn
Yn,it
Kn,it
(B.35)
FOC w.r.t. Y nx,it:
∂L
∂Y nx,it
: Px,t −MCn,it(1− αn − γn)An,t (µtHn,it)αn (Kn,it)γn
(
Y nx,it
)−αn−γn
= 0 (B.36)
Px,t = MCn,it(1− α− γn)Yn,it
Y nx,it
(B.37)
Marginal Cost
Using equations B.33, B.35 and B.37 we can derive the expression for the firm’s marginal
cost.
Using (B.33) and (B.35) we get:
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Wn,t
Rn,t
=
αn
γn
Yn,it
Hn,it
Kn,it
Yn,it
=
αn
γn
Kn,it
Hn,it
Kn,it =
γn
αn
Wn,t
Rn,t
Hn,it
(B.38)
Using (B.33) and (B.37) we get:
Wn,t
Px,t
=
αn
1− α− γn
Yn,it
Hn,it
Y nx,it
Yn,it
=
αn
1− α− γn
Y nx,it
Hn,it
Y nx,it =
1− α− γn
αn
Wn,t
Px,t
Hn,it
(B.39)
Expressions B.38 and B.39 can be substituted into the first-order condition for labour,
equation B.33, to derive the final expression for the firm’s marginal cost. From equation
B.33, we get:
MCn,it = Wn,t
1
αn
Hn,it
Yn,it
= Wn,t
1
αn
Hn,it
An,t (µtHn,it)
αn (Kn,it)
γn
(
Y nx,it
)1−αn−γn (B.40)
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Using expressions B.38 and B.39, we get:
MCn,it = Wn,t
1
αn
Hn,it
An,t (µtHn,it)
αn
(
αn
γn
)γn (Rn,t
Wn,t
)γn ( 1
Hn,it
)γn ( αn
1− αn − γn
Px,t
Wn,tHn,it
)1−αn−γn
=
1
An
(Wn,t)
αn(αn)
−αn(µt)−αn
(
Rn,t
γn
)γn ( Px,t
1− αn − γn
)1−αn−γn
=
1
An
(
Wn,t
αnµt
)αn (Rn,t
γn,t
)γn ( Px,t
1− αn − γn
)1−αn−γn
(B.41)
All firms face the same marginal costs, so we can drop the i subscript. A shock term, εn,t,
is also included to account for changes in marginal costs that are unrelated to factor input
costs. Thus we get the expression for marginal costs, given in the text:
MCn,t =
εn,t
An
(
Wn,t
αnµt
)αn (Rn,t
γn,t
)γn ( Px,t
1− αn − γn
)1−αn−γn
(B.42)
A similar procedure to the one above, yields the relevant equations for the manufacturing
sector.
B.4.2 Profit Maximisation Problem
Since these intermediate good producers have some monopoly power, they set their prices
by maximising profits subject to the relevant demand constraint.
max
{Pn,it+l}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
l=0
Dt,t+l
Pn,it+lYn,it+lPt+l − MCn,it+lYn,it+lPt+l − τn2
(
Pn,it+l
Πηn,t+l−1Π1−ηPn,it+l−1
− 1
)2
Pn,t+lYn,t+l
Pt+l

(B.43)
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subject to
Yn,it+l =
(
Pn,it+l
Pn,t+l
)−θn
Yn,t+l (B.44)
where Dt,t+l = β
l Uc,t+l
Uc,t
= βl λt+l
λt
is the relevant stochastic discount factor. Substituting the
demand function into the profit function yields:
Et
∞∑
l=0
βl
λt+l
λt
{
Pn,it+l
Pt+l
(
Pn,it+l
Pn,t+l
)−θn
Yn,t+l −MCrn,it+l
(
Pn,it+l
Pn,t+l
)−θn
Yn,t+l
− τn
2
(
Pn,it+l
Πηn,t+l−1Π1−ηPn,it+l−1
− 1
)2
Pn,t+lYn,t+l
Pt+l
} (B.45)
which my be re-written as:3
Et
∞∑
l=0
βl
λt+l
λt
{(
Pn,it+l
Pn,t+l
)1−θn Pn,t+l
Pt+l
Yn,t+l −MCrn,it+l
(
Pn,it+l
Pn,t+l
)−θn
Yn,t+l
− τn
2
(
Pn,it+l
Πηn,t+l−1Π1−ηPn,it+l−1
− 1
)2
Pn,t+lYn,t+l
Pt+l
} (B.46)
3where MCrn,it+l =
MCn,it+l
Pt+l
is the real marginal costs.
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Taking the derivative of B.46 with respect to Pn,it+l yields:
βl
λt+l
λt
{
(1− θn)P−θnn,it+l
(
1
Pn,t+l
)1−θn Pn,t+l
Pt+l
Yn,t+l + θnMC
r
n,it+l(Pn,it+l)
−θn−1
(
1
Pn,t+l
)−θn
Yn,t+l
− τn
(
Pn,it+l
Πηn,t+l−1Π1−ηPn,it+l−1
− 1
)
1
Πηn,t+l−1Π1−ηPn,it+l−1
Pn,t+lYn,t+l
Pt+l
}
+ βl+1
λt+l+1
λt{
τn
(
Pn,it+l+1
Πηn,t+lΠ
1−ηPn,it+l
− 1
)
Pn,it+l+1
Πηn,t+lΠ
1−ηP 2n,it+l
Pn,t+l+1Yn,t+l+1
Pt+l+1
}
= 0
(B.47)
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms face the same problem and will thus charge the same
price. Imposing this symmetric equilibrium and evaluating expression B.47 at the current
period, we get the first-order condition for price setting:
(1−MCrn,t)θn =1− τn
(
Πn,t
Πηn,t−1Π1−η
− 1
)
Πn,t
Πηn,t−1Π1−η
+
τnβ
λt+1
λt
{(
Πn,t+1
Πηn,tΠ
1−η − 1
)
Πn,t+1
Πηn,tΠ
1−η
Yn,t+1
Yn,t
} (B.48)
Log-linerizing equation B.48 about the steady-state of the variables, yields the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve.
B.5 The Log-linearized System of Equations
The log-linearized equations of the model are presented in this section. Since the model
features a permanent productivity shock, captured by µt, this implies that real variables
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also grow at the same rate in the long-run. The optimality and market-clearing conditions
of the model must therefore first be normalised by the technology factor so as to be made
stationary. It is these stationary conditions that are then log-linearized and used to solve
the model. Lower-case letters indicate that variables have been made stationary with the
trend level of technology, that is xt =
Xt
µt
. A hat over a variable indicates it is in terms of
log deviation from its steady state value, xˆt = lnxt− lnx. Where variables without a time
subscript refer to steady state values.
The household’s inter-temporal consumption equation is:
(µ− d)(µ− βd)λˆt =(µ2 − µd)ξˆc,t − (dβµ− d2β)ξˆc,t+1 − (µ2 + d2β)cˆt
+ µd(cˆt + βcˆt+1 − µˆt + βµˆt+1)
(B.49)
Household labour supply decision for each sector is:
wˆj,t = (χ− ς)hˆt + ςhˆj,t − λˆt for j ∈ {n,m, x} (B.50)
Household investment decision for each sector is:
λˆkj,t = Φ
kµ2
[
(1 + β)ˆij,t − iˆj,t−1 − βiˆj,t+1 − βµˆt+1 + µˆt
]
+ λˆt − Υˆt for j ∈ {n,m, x}
(B.51)
where λkj,t is the shadow price of productive capital.
The equilibrium condition for capital in each sector is given by:
λˆkj,t = λˆt+1 + rˆj,t+1 + µˆt − µˆt+1 −
β(1− δ)
µ
(
λˆt+1 + rˆj,t+1 − λˆkj,t+1
)
(B.52)
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The law of motion for capital is:
kˆj,t+l =
1− δ
µ
(kˆj,t − µˆt) + µ− 1 + δ
µ
(Υˆj,t + iˆj,t) for j ∈ {n,m, x} (B.53)
The household’s CES composite labour supply bundle is defined as follows:
Hˆt =
(
Hn
H
)1+ς
Hˆn,t +
(
Hm
H
)1+ς
Hˆm,t +
(
Hx
H
)1+ς
Hˆx,t (B.54)
The sectoral production functions are given by:
yˆj,t = Aˆj,t + αjHˆj,t + γj kˆj,t + (1− αj − γj)yˆjx,t for j ∈ {n,m, x} (B.55)
Phillips curves for the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors are:
pˆij,t =
β
1 + ηβ
pˆij,t+1 +
κj
1 + ηβ
mˆcj,t +
η
1 + ηβ
pˆij,t−1 + εj,t for j ∈ {n,m} (B.56)
where κj =
θj−1
τj
.
Real marginal costs in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors are:
mˆcj,t = αjwˆj,t + γj rˆj,t + (1− αj − γj)pˆx,t − pˆj,t − Aˆj,t for j ∈ {n,m} (B.57)
where pj,t denotes the relative price of good j, such that pj,t = ln
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
.
The capital to labour ratio in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors are:
hˆj,t = kˆj,t + rˆj,t − wˆj,t − µˆt for j ∈ {n,m} (B.58)
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The capital to commodities ratio in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors are:
yˆjx,t = kˆj,t + rˆj,t − pˆx,t − µˆt for j ∈ {n,m} (B.59)
The Phillips curve for the import sector:
pˆif,t =
β
1 + ηβ
pˆif,t+1 +
κf
1 + ηβ
mˆc
f,t
+
η
1 + ηβ
pˆif,t−1 + εf,t (B.60)
where κf =
θf−1
τf
.
Marginal cost for the import sector (modified to accommodate possible deviations from
the Law of one price):
mˆc
f,t
= qˆt − pˆf,t (B.61)
Labour demand in the commodities sector:
hˆx,t = pˆx,t + yˆx,t − wˆx,t (B.62)
Capital demand in the commodities sector:
kˆx,t = pˆx,t + yˆx,t − rˆx,t (B.63)
The definition of the domestic-currency price of commodities:
pˆx,t =
1
2
(qˆt + pˆ
∗
x,t) +
1
2
pˆx,t−1 (B.64)
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Foreign currency price of commodities:
pˆ∗x,t = ρp∗x pˆ
∗
x,t−1 + εp∗x,t (B.65)
Foreign demand for manufacture exports:
yˆexm = −ν∗(pˆ∗m,t) + yˆ∗t (B.66)
Domestic demand for non-tradable, manufactured and imported goods:
yˆj,t = −νpˆj,t + fˆ gt for j ∈ {n,m, f} (B.67)
Market clearing in the manufacturing sector:
ymyˆm,t = y
ex
m yˆ
ex
m,t + y
d
myˆ
d
m,t (B.68)
Market clearing in the commodities sector:
yxyˆx,t = y
ex
x yˆ
ex
x,t + y
n
x yˆ
n
x,t + y
m
x yˆ
m
x,t (B.69)
Uses of the domestic final good:
fg(fˆ gt) = ccˆt + iˆit + ggˆt (B.70)
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Definition of aggregate investment:
iˆit = iniˆn,t + imiˆm,t + ixiˆx,t (B.71)
Real value-added in the non-tradable and manufacturing sector:
yvaj yˆ
va
j,t = yj yˆj,t −
px
pj
yjxyˆ
j
x,t j ∈ {n,m} (B.72)
Total real valued-added:
yvayˆvat = pny
va
n yˆ
va
n,t + pmy
va
m yˆ
va
m,t + pxyxyˆx,t (B.73)
The current account equation:
b∗t
κr∗
=
b∗t−1
pi∗µ
+
pxy
ex
x
yva
(pˆx,t + yˆ
ex
x,t − yˆvat ) +
p∗my
ex
m
yva
(pˆ∗m,t + yˆ
ex
m,t − yˆvat )
− qyf
yva
(qˆt + yˆf,t − yˆvat )
(B.74)
Uncovered interest rate parity condition:
qˆt+1 − qˆt = pˆi∗t+1 − pˆit+1 + rˆt − rˆ∗t − κˆt (B.75)
Country-specific risk premium:
κˆt = −κ(b∗t ) + Ψˆt (B.76)
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By definition of the real exchange rate:
qˆt − qˆt−1 + pˆit − pˆi∗t = ∆sˆt (B.77)
Definition of the aggregate price index implies:
0 = ωjp
1−ν
j (1− ν)pˆj,t j ∈ {n,m, f} (B.78)
where pˆj,t is the relative price in sector j, which evolves according to:
pˆj,t = pˆj,t−1 + pˆij,t − pˆit (B.79)
The Taylor rule of the monetary authority is:
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(%pipˆit + %yyˆvat ) + εr,t (B.80)
The foreign economy:
IS curve: yˆ∗t = yˆ
∗
t+1 − (rˆ∗t − pˆit+1)− ξˆy∗,t (B.81)
Phillips curve: pˆit = βpˆit+1 + κ
∗yˆ∗t + εpi∗,t (B.82)
Taylor rule: rˆ∗t = ρr∗ rˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρr∗)
(
%pi∗pˆi
∗
t + %y∗ yˆ
∗
t
)
+ εr∗,t (B.83)
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Response of the Small-scale DSGE Model to Shocks
Figure C.1: Response of DSGE Model to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure C.2: Response of DSGE model to a Stock Market Shock
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Figure C.3: Response of DSGE Model to a News Shock
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C.2 Data Series
Figure C.4: Canadian Data
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Figure C.5: US Data
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C.3 Impulse Responses: Short-run Identification
Figure C.6: Response of SVAR Model to a Monetary Policy shock in Canada-
Short-run Identification
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Figure C.7: Response of SVAR Model to a Stock Market Shock in Canada-
Short-run Identification
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Figure C.8: Response of SVAR model to a monetary policy shock in the U.S.-
Short-run Identification
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Figure C.9: Response of SVAR model to a stock market shock in the U.S -
Short-run Identification
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C.4 Robustness Graphs: Short-run Restrictions
Figure C.10: Response of SVAR model to a policy rate shock in Canada with
some short-run restrictions
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Figure C.11: Response of SVAR model to a policy rate shock in the U.S. with
some short-run restrictions
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Figure C.12: Response of SVAR model to a stock market shock in Canada
with some short-run restrictions
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Figure C.13: Response of SVAR model to a stock market shock in the U.S.
with some short-run restrictions
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C.5 Robustness Graphs: 4-variable VAR
Figure C.14: Response of 4-variable SVAR model to a policy rate shock in
Canada
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Figure C.15: Response of 4-variable SVAR model to a policy rate shock in
the U.S.
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Figure C.16: Response of 4-variable SVAR model to a stock market shock in
Canada
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Figure C.17: Response of 4-variable SVAR model to a stock market shock in
the U.S.
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